### 1AC Solvency

#### **First, there are large reserves waiting to be drilled in Cuba**

Sadowski 11 Richard Sadowski is a Class of 2012 J.D. candidate, at Hofstra University¶ School of Law, NY. Mr. Sadowski is also the Managing Editor of Production of¶ the Journal of International Business and Law Vol. XI. “Cuban Offshore Drilling: Preparation and¶ Prevention within the Framework of the United¶ States’ Embargo” – ¶ Sustainable Development Law & Policy¶ Volume 12; Issue 1 Fall 2011: Natural Resource Conflicts Article 10 – http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1497&context=sdlp

A U.S. Geological Survey estimates that Cuba’s offshore¶ oil fields hold at least four and a half billion barrels of recoverable¶ oil and ten trillion cubic feet of natural gas.29 Cupet, the¶ state-owned Cuban energy company, insists that actual reserves¶ are double that of the U.S. estimate.30 One estimate indicates¶ that Cuba could be producing 525,000 barrels of oil per day.31¶ Given this vast resource, Cuba has already leased offshore oil¶ exploration blocks to operators from Spain, Norway, and India.32¶ Offshore oil discoveries in Cuba are placing increasing pressure¶ for the United States to end the embargo. First, U.S. energy companies¶ are eager to compete for access to Cuban oil reserves.33¶ Secondly, fears of a Cuban oil spill are argued to warrant U.S.¶ investment and technology.34 Finally, the concern over Cuban¶ offshore drilling renews cries that the embargo is largely a failure¶ and harms human rights.

#### Cuban government would say yes

Franks 8 Jeff Franks – Havana correspondent for Reuter’s – New York Times – 6/12/2008¶ http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/12/business/worldbusiness/12iht-cubaoil.4.13670441.html?\_r=0

Representative Jeff Flake, an Arizona Republican who has introduced bills in Congress to lift the embargo for oil companies, said the environmental argument might be crucial because there was much concern in Florida about potential oil spills.¶ "If there are going to be oil rigs off of Florida, I think most Americans would be more comfortable if they were U.S. oil rigs, rather than Chinese for example," Flake said.¶ He said U.S. companies were definitely interested in Cuba, but have not publicly pushed for embargo change. During interviews, industry executives emphasized they did not oppose the embargo because it was U.S. national policy and were pushing instead for access to U.S. areas that were currently prohibited, like offshore western Florida.¶ "When U.S. companies are not even allowed to drill in the eastern half of the Gulf of Mexico, we have a long way to go before we can think about international waters off the coast of Cuba," said J.Larry Nichols, chairman of Devon Energy, an independent U.S. oil and natural gas producer.¶ Cuba has said it would welcome U.S. companies to its offshore field and showed its interest by sending Cubapetroleo representatives to a 2006 conference in Mexico City that included companies like the U.S. oil giant Exxon Mobil and the top independent U.S. refiner, Valero Energy.

#### US oil companies will say yes

Benjamin-Alvarado 10 Jonathan Benjamin-Alvarado, PhD of Political Science, University of Nebraska, 2010, “Cuba’s Energy Future: Strategic Approaches to Cooperation,” a Brookings Publication – obtained as an ebook through MSU Electronic Resources – page 17

There has been no lack of interest on the part of American international oil firms in developing a Cuban market for joint-venture projects and technology transfer and production-sharing agreements in the energy sector. The prevailing Cuban model of joint-venture investment and cooperation has proved to be attractive internationally, and Cuba offers American firms numerous opportunities of this type. There will have to be significant changes to the Cuban embargo before this type of engagement can occur, but recent history shows that Cuba possesses the potential to be a strong regional trade partner in the area of energy and infrastructure development. The numerous joint-venture projects presently under way in energy development and infrastructure (oil refineries, pipelines, and port facilities) between Cuba and a growing list of foreign partners is a positive indicator of that potential.

### 1AC Plan

#### The Plan: As they pertain to crude oil reservoirs, the United States federal government should lift its restrictions that preclude firms from exploring, extracting, refining, importing, or coordinating engineering and safety protocols with the Republic of Cuba.

### 1AC Spills

#### **Drilling is inevitable—Russia coming within the next six months**

Tamayo 5/31—Juan Tamayo, writer for the Miami Herald (“Russian oil company suspends exploration in Cuba”, 5/31/13, <http://www.miamiherald.com/2013/05/31/3424471/russian-oil-company-suspends.html>, zs)

A Russian state oil company drilling off Cuba’s northern shores has reportedly confirmed that it is temporarily halting its exploration — the fourth disappointment for Cuba’s dreams of energy self-sufficiency in less than two years.¶ The announcement by Zarubezhneft signaled an end to the only active exploration program on the island, which now relies on highly subsidized oil from the beleaguered Venezuelan government of President Nicolas Maduro.¶ Zarubezhneft confirmed this week that it was halting work due to “geological” problems but added that it will resume its exploration next year, the Reuters news agency reported Thursday in a dispatch from Havana.¶ The Russians withdrawal had been expected because the Norwegian company that owns the drilling platform they have been leasing, the Songa Mercur, already had announced that it would be leaving Cuban waters in July for another contract.¶ Zarubezhneft’s confirmation, nevertheless, signals “another disappointment” for Cuba’s dreams of finding oil in its waters, said Jorge Pinon, a Cuba energy expert at the University of Texas in Austin.¶ The U.S. Geological Survey has estimated that Cuba’s offshore waters have “significant undiscovered conventional oil potential” — between 4.6 billion and 9.3 billion barrels. Cuban officials estimate the potential reserves at 20 billion.¶ “This is the second geological area in Cuba that … seemed to be promising,” Pinon said of Zarubezhneft’s exploration block. But finding the oil means “you have to go into your pocket to drill exploratory wells.”¶ Spain’s Repsol oil company spent $100 million in the early part of 2012 unsuccessfully exploring with the Scarabeo 9 drilling platform, especially built in China to avoid the restrictions of the U.S. embargo, in deep waters northwest of Havana.¶ Petronas of Malaysia, Russia’s Gazprom and Petroleos de Venezuela SA (PDVSA) later leased the Scarabeo platform but also struck out, and the rig left Cuban waters at the end of last year.¶ Zarubezhneft then gave it a try, leasing the Songa Mercur to explore waters not as deep and east of Havana starting late last year. Neighboring Bahamas also has expressed interest in that area, but the Russians also drilled a dry hole.¶ The Russians are considered likely to meet their promise to return next year because President Vladimir Putin’s government has been pushing hard to warm up political and commercial ties with Moscow’s one-time allies in Havana.¶ Cuba’s oil explorations have caused concern among U.S. environmentalists and tourism officials that any spills would impact the entire Eastern Seaboard, from the Florida Keys to Cape Cod in Massachusetts.¶ Supporters of improving U.S. relations with Cuba argued that Washington should allow American oil firms to get a piece of the potential profits. The U.S. embargo adds about 20 percent to that island’s exploration costs, according to Cuban officials.

#### **Cuba drilling inevitable—new rigs outside of Mariel being explored**

Gonzalez 3/4—Ivet Gonzalez, correspondent for IPS Cuba (“Cuba Diversifies – But Energy Focus Still on Oil”, 3/4/13, <http://www.ipsnews.net/2013/03/cuba-diversifies-but-energy-focus-still-on-oil/>, zs)

In January 2012, the Scarabeo 9 drilling rig was brought to Cuba from Asia to sink an exploratory well into the seabed in the Gulf of Mexico. Cuba estimates that there could be up to 20 billion barrels of oil reserves in a 112,000-square kilometre area, although the United States projects a total of about five billion barrels.¶ But in November, Cuba’s Ministry of Basic Industry announced that the rig would be removed from Cuba, after three failed attempts to find a commercially viable well, financed by PDVSA, Spain’s Repsol, PC Gulf – a subsidiary of Malaysia’s Petronas – and Gazpromneft of Russia.¶ After this harsh blow, Cupet reported that the Moscow-based firm Zarubezhneft would explore for oil off north-central Cuba using the Norwegian-owned Songa Mercur drilling platform. The Russian state-run company is drilling a 6,500-metre well in an endeavour that is expected to take six months.¶ The Cuban government has not lost hope that the country will manage to become self-sufficient in energy. In another important development zone, around the port of El Mariel in the province of Artemisa, bordering Havana, the plan is to create a support base for future oil industry activity.¶ But the need to diversify the energy supply is increasingly seen as a priority in Cuba’s current economic reform process.

#### **Cuban safety is insufficient—absent the plan spills reach Florida in 6 days**

Bert and Clayton 12—Melissa Bert and Blake Clayton, Military fellow and fellow for energy and national security CFR (“Addressing the Risk of a Cuban Oil Spill”, 3/12, <http://www.cfr.org/cuba/addressing-risk-cuban-oil-spill/p27515>, zs)

Washington cannot count on the technical know-how of Cuba's unseasoned oil industry to address a spill on its own. Oil industry experts doubt that it has a strong understanding of how to prevent an offshore oil spill or stem a deep-water well blowout. Moreover, the site where the first wells will be drilled is a tough one for even seasoned response teams to operate in. Unlike the calm Gulf of Mexico, the surface currents in the area where Repsol will be drilling move at a brisk three to four knots, which would bring oil from Cuba's offshore wells to the Florida coast within six to ten days. Skimming or burning the oil may not be feasible in such fast-moving water. The most, and possibly only, effective method to respond to a spill would be surface and subsurface dispersants. If dispersants are not applied close to the source within four days after a spill, uncontained oil cannot be dispersed, burnt, or skimmed, which would render standard response technologies like containment booms ineffective.

#### **Absent experts accidents are inevitable—embargo blocks use**

Bolstad 12—Erika Bolstad, writer for McClatchy newspaper (“Cuba embargo could threaten oil-drilling safety, expert says”, 5/10/12, <http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2012/05/10/148433/cuba-embargo-could-threaten-oil.html#.Ug0gFGTwKkZ>, zs)

The 50-year-old U.S. embargo of Cuba is getting in the way of safety when it comes to deepwater drilling in Cuban waters, an expert on the communist country’s offshore drilling activity said Thursday.¶ Lee Hunt, the former president of the International Association of Drilling Contractors, warned that Cold War-era economic sanctions threaten not only Florida’s economy and environment but that of Cuba, too, in the event of a major disaster on the scale of 2010’s Deepwater Horizon oil spill. The worst-case scenario is "state-sponsored chaos at a disaster site," Hunt said during an event sponsored by the Center for International Policy, a Washington think tank that advocates for a foreign policy based on human rights.¶ The U.S. Coast Guard has extensive response plans, as does the state of Florida. But Hunt said he would give prevention efforts an "F" grade. He likened the work to stocking body bags for a plane crash – but not training pilots to fly safely or to maintain aircraft properly.¶ "We’re getting ready for what will inevitably happen if we don’t take the right proactive steps," Hunt said.¶ His warning and that of other experts came as the Spanish oil company Repsol is about to tap an offshore reservoir beneath 5,600 feet of seawater and about 14,000 feet of rock. The company, the first of many set to drill for oil off Cuba’s coast, is working just 77 nautical miles from Key West.¶ Workers are about a week from completing their drilling and are beginning the technically demanding phase of capping the well and preparing it for possible production, the panelists at the event said.¶ Former U.S. Environmental Protection Agency chief William Reilly, who along with former Florida Sen. Bob Graham co-chaired the presidential commission that examined BP’s Deepwater Horizon spill, said that in his most recent visit to Cuba he was reassured that Repsol was moving slowly in Cuban waters to avoid any surprises. Dan Whittle of the Environmental Defense Fund said that in his visits to Cuba, well-thumbed copies of the commission’s report looked as though they were "read even more in Havana than here."¶ Reilly also noted that Cuban officials are regular readers of daily bulletins from U.S. agencies on U.S. oil drilling regulations. He said he urged them to follow Mexican offshore guidelines – which he said are based on U.S. rules.¶ "Nobody is predicting a catastrophe in association with anything that the Cubans are overseeing," Reilly said. "In every way, the Cuban approach to this is responsible, careful and attentive to the risks that they know they’re undertaking."¶ "Nevertheless, should there be a need for a response . . . the United States government has not interpreted its sanctions policy in a way that would clearly make available in advance the kind of technologies that would be required," Reilly said.

#### **Independently hurricanes cause spills and spread oil**

Stephens et al 11—Sarah Stephens, Executive director for Democracies of the Americas (“As Cuba plans to drill in the Gulf of Mexico, U.S. policy poses needless risks to our national interest”, 2011, <http://democracyinamericas.org/pdfs/Cuba_Drilling_and_US_Policy.pdf>, zs)

The BP disaster highlights the needs for a timely response to spills, the¶ containment of damage, and clean-up. There were approximately eight rigs¶ capable of drilling relief wells to the depth of Macondo that were available¶ in the Gulf. If the blow-out occurred in Cuban territorial water, the embargo¶ would not allow rigs capable of drilling relief wells to be contracted by the¶ operator (Repsol or CUPET, in the first instance).¶ Companies under the current rules cannot hire a U.S. firm to drill a relief¶ well. In fact, legislation¶ 50¶ introduced in the U.S. Congress in 2010 would have¶ penalized such activities under The Helms-Burton Act.¶ 51¶ Of greater risk and concern, however, is that spills are often more likely¶ because of hurricane activity prevalent in the Gulf, and are exacerbated by¶ the role hurricanes play in spreading oil after a spill.¶ 52¶ In the event of a spill, were assistance from U.S. firms permitted, relief¶ would take 24–48 hours to arrive on scene. Barring their participation, ¶ however, it would take 30–50 days for help to arrive from Brazil, Northern¶ Europe, Africa, or S.E. Asia. In the case of the BP spill, as Lee Hunt said,¶ “Admiral Landry¶ 53¶ (8th Coast Guard District Commander) had personnel¶ 24 hours x 7 days a week on phones to get booms; can Repsol or any¶ subsequent operator do that?”¶ 54¶ OFAC, the Treasury Department office that administers and enforces trade¶ sanctions, has authority to issue licenses on an emergency basis, but the BP¶ spill shows that the early, critical response needed would be made slower by¶ the time required to procure licenses.¶ 55¶ The Obama administration argues that¶ some firms are pre-cleared to respond. But experts say the current scheme¶ makes it impossible to pre-clear the correct technology, and that much more¶ needs to be done—and can be done—under current law.

#### **Aff boosts reaction time—US experts solve best**

Zakaria 11—Fareed Zakaria, Host and journalist on CNN about US foreign policy (“Why our Cuba embargo could lead to another Gulf oil disaster”, 9/19/11, <http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2011/09/19/why-our-cuba-policy-could-lead-to-another-gulf-oil-spill/>, zs)

Can you remember what explosive crisis America and the world was fixated on last summer? It wasn't the deficit, jobs or Europe. It was an oil disaster. Remember the BP spill? Tons of crude gushing into the Gulf of Mexico? Well, in the weeks and months that followed, there was a lot of discussion about how to make sure it didn't happen again.¶ But what struck me this week is that we have a new dangerous drilling zone right on our doorstep - Cuba. Estimates suggest that the island nation has reserves of anywhere from 5 billion to 20 billion barrels of oil. The high end of those estimates would put Cuba among the top dozen oil producers in the world.¶ Predictably, there's a global scramble for Havana. A Chinese-constructed drilling rig is owned by an Italian oil company and is on its way to Cuban waters. Spain's Repsol, Norway's Statoil and India's ONGC will use the 53,000 ton rig to explore for oil. Petro giants from Brazil, Venezuela, Malaysia and Vietnam are also swooping in.¶ Of course, we can't partake because we don't trade with Cuba. But what about at least making sure there are some safety procedures that are followed that would protect the American coastline? You see at 5,500 feet below sea level, these oil rigs off Cuba will go even deeper than the Deepwater Horizon rig that blew up on our coast last year, and the coast of Florida, remember, is just 60 miles away from Cuban waters.¶ What happens if there's another oil spill? Will it be easy and quick to clean up? No. You see, the nearest and best experts on safety procedures and dealing with oil spills are all American, but we are forbidden by our laws from being involved in any way with Cuba. Our trade embargo on Cuba not only prevents us from doing business with our neighbor but it also bars us from sending equipment and expertise to help even in a crisis. So, if there is an explosion, we will watch while the waters of the Gulf Coast get polluted. Now, this is obviously a worst case hypothetical, but it's precisely the kind of danger we should plan for and one we can easily protect against if we were allowed to have any dealings with Cuba.¶ This whole mess is an allegory for a larger problem. We imposed an embargo on Cuba at the height of the Cold War, 52 years ago, when we were worried about Soviet expansion and the spread of communism. Well, there is no more Soviet Union, and I don't think there's a person in the world who believes America could be infected by Cuban communism today. But the antique policies remain - antique and failed policies. They were designed, you recall, to force regime change in Cuba. Well, the Castros have thrived for five decades, using American hostility as a badge of Cuban nationalism. All the embargo has done is to weaken the Cuban people, keep them impoverished and cut them off from the world.

#### **Oil spills spread and kills biodiversity ecosystems**

Almeida 12—Robert Almeida, former Naval Officer and partner at gCaptain (“Drilling Off Cuba, and How the Embargo Could be Very Costly for the US”, 5/18/12, <http://gcaptain.com/drilling-cuba-embargo-badly/>, zs)

In short however, Cuba’s access to containment systems, offshore technology, and spill response equipment is severely restricted by the US embargo, yet if a disaster occurs offshore, not only will Cuban ecosystems be severely impacted, but those of the Florida Keys, and US East Coast.¶ If disaster strikes offshore Cuba, US citizens will have nobody else to blame except the US Government because outdated policies are impacting the ability to prepare sufficiently for real-life environmental threats. Considering Cuba waters are home to the highest concentration of biodiversity in the region and is a spawning ground for fish populations that migrate north into US waters, a Cuban oil spill could inflict unprecedented environmental devastation if not planned for in advance.

#### Biodiversity in specific hotspots checks extinction— key to ag, medicine

Mittermeier 11 (et al, Dr. Russell Alan Mittermeier is a primatologist, From Chapter One of the book Biodiversity Hotspots http://www.academia.edu/1536096/Global\_biodiversity\_conservation\_the\_critical\_role\_of\_hotspots)

Extinction is the gravest consequence of the biodiversity crisis, since it is¶ irreversible. Human activities have elevated the rate of species extinctions to a¶ thousand or more times the natural background rate (Pimm et al. 1995). What are the¶ consequences of this loss? Most obvious among them may be the lost opportunity¶ for future resource use. Scientists have discovered a mere fraction of Earth’s species¶ (perhaps fewer than 10%, or even 1%) and understood the biology of even fewer¶ (Novotny et al. 2002). As species vanish, so too does the health security of every¶ human. Earth’s species are a vast genetic storehouse that may harbor a cure for¶ cancer, malaria, or the next new pathogen – cures waiting to be discovered.¶ Compounds initially derived from wild species account for more than half of all¶ commercial medicines – even more in developing nations (Chivian and Bernstein¶ 2008). Natural forms, processes, and ecosystems provide blueprints and inspiration¶ for a growing array of new materials, energy sources, hi-tech devices, and¶ other innovations (Benyus 2009). The current loss of species has been compared¶ to burning down the world’s libraries without knowing the content of 90% or¶ more of the books. With loss of species, we lose the ultimate source of our crops¶ and the genes we use to improve agricultural resilience, the inspiration for¶ manufactured products, and the basis of the structure and function of the ecosystems¶ that support humans and all life on Earth (McNeely et al. 2009). Above and beyond¶ material welfare and livelihoods, biodiversity contributes to security, resiliency,¶ and freedom of choices and actions (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005).¶ Less tangible, but no less important, are the cultural, spiritual, and moral costs¶ inflicted by species extinctions. All societies value species for their own sake,¶ and wild plants and animals are integral to the fabric of all the world’s cultures¶ (Wilson 1984). The road to extinction is made even more perilous to people by the loss of the broader ecosystems that underpin our livelihoods, communities, and economies(McNeely et al.2009). The loss of coastal wetlands and mangrove forests, for example, greatly exacerbates both human mortality and economic damage from tropical cyclones (Costanza et al.2008; Das and Vincent2009), while disease outbreaks such as the 2003 emergence of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome in East Asia have been directly connected to trade in wildlife for human consumption(Guan et al.2003). Other consequences of biodiversity loss, more subtle but equally damaging, include the deterioration of Earth’s natural capital. Loss of biodiversity on land in the past decade alone is estimated to be costing the global economy $500 billion annually (TEEB2009). Reduced diversity may also reduce resilience of ecosystems and the human communities that depend on them. For example, more diverse coral reef communities have been found to suffer less from the diseases that plague degraded reefs elsewhere (Raymundo et al.2009). As Earth’s climate changes, the roles of species and ecosystems will only increase in their importance to humanity (Turner et al.2009).¶ In many respects, conservation is local. People generally care more about the biodiversity in the place in which they live. They also depend upon these ecosystems the most – and, broadly speaking, it is these areas over which they have the most control. Furthermore, we believe that all biodiversity is important and that every nation, every region, and every community should do everything possible to conserve their living resources. So, what is the importance of setting global priorities? Extinction is a global phenomenon, with impacts far beyond nearby administrative borders. More practically, biodiversity, the threats to it, and the ability of countries to pay for its conservation vary around the world. The vast majority of the global conservation budget – perhaps 90% – originates in and is spent in economically wealthy countries (James et al.1999). It is thus critical that those globally ﬂexible funds available – in the hundreds of millions annually – be guided by systematic priorities if we are to move deliberately toward a global goal of reducing biodiversity loss.¶ The establishment of priorities for biodiversity conservation is complex, but can be framed as a single question. Given the choice, where should action toward reducing the loss of biodiversity be implemented ﬁrst? The ﬁeld of conservation planning addresses this question and revolves around a framework of vulnerability and irreplaceability (Margules and Pressey2000). Vulnerability measures the risk to the species present in a region – if the species and ecosystems that are highly threatened are not protected now, we will not get another chance in the future. Irreplaceability measures the extent to which spatial substitutes exist for securing biodiversity. The number of species alone is an inadequate indication of conserva-tion priority because several areas can share the same species. In contrast, areas with high levels of endemism are irreplaceable. We must conserve these places because the unique species they contain cannot be saved elsewhere. Put another way, biodiversity is not evenly distributed on our planet. It is heavily concentrated in certain areas, these areas have exceptionally high concentrations of endemic species found nowhere else, and many (but not all) of these areas are the areas at greatest risk of disappearing because of heavy human impact.¶ Myers’ seminal paper (Myers1988) was the ﬁrst application of the principles of irreplaceability and vulnerability to guide conservation planning on a global scale. Myers described ten tropical forest “hotspots” on the basis of extraordinary plant endemism and high levels of habitat loss, albeit without quantitative criteria for the designation of “hotspot” status. A subsequent analysis added eight additional hotspots, including four from Mediterranean-type ecosystems (Myers 1990).After adopting hotspots as an institutional blueprint in 1989, Conservation Interna-tional worked with Myers in a ﬁrst systematic update of the hotspots. It introduced two strict quantitative criteria: to qualify as a hotspot, a region had to contain at least 1,500 vascular plants as endemics (¶ >¶ 0.5% of the world’s total), and it had to have 30% or less of its original vegetation (extent of historical habitat cover)remaining. These efforts culminated in an extensive global review (Mittermeier et al.1999) and scientiﬁc publication (Myers et al.2000) that introduced seven new hotspots on the basis of both the better-deﬁned criteria and new data. A second systematic update (Mittermeier et al.2004) did not change the criteria, but revisited the set of hotspots based on new data on the distribution of species and threats, as well as genuine changes in the threat status of these regions. That update redeﬁned several hotspots, such as the Eastern Afromontane region, and added several others that were suspected hotspots but for which sufﬁcient data either did not exist or were not accessible to conservation scientists outside of those regions. Sadly, it uncovered another region – the East Melanesian Islands – which rapid habitat destruction had in a short period of time transformed from a biodiverse region that failed to meet the “less than 30% of original vegetation remaining” criterion to a genuine hotspot.

#### Caribbean is one such hotspot

CEPF ’10 (quoting Mittermeier -- the same author that establishes the “hotspot” thesis and writes our impact ev. , Dr. Russell Alan Mittermeier is a primatologist, “Ecosystem Profile: THE CARIBBEAN ISLANDS BIODIVERSITY HOTSPOT” Jan 15th – http://www.cepf.net/Documents/Final\_Caribbean\_EP.pdf)

The Caribbean Islands Hotspot is one of the world’s greatest centers of biodiversity and¶ endemism, yet its biodiversity and the natural¶ services it provides are highly threatened. Although¶ the islands have protected areas systems, most ar¶ e inadequately managed and important areas lack¶ protection. This strategy will ensure that CEPF¶ funds are employed in the most effective manner¶ and generate significant conservation results that¶ not only complement the actions of other¶ stakeholders but also enable significant expansion¶ of strategic conservation for the benefit of all.¶ Everyone depends on Earth’s ecosystems and their life-sustaining benefits, such as clean air,¶ fresh water and healthy soils. Founded in 2000,¶ the Critical Ecosystem Partnership Fund (CEPF)¶ has become a global leader in en¶ abling civil society to participate in and benefit from conserving¶ some of the world’s most critical ecosystems. C¶ EPF is a joint initiative of l'Agence Française de¶ Développement, Conservation International, the Gl¶ obal Environment Facility, the Government of¶ Japan, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, and the World Bank. As one of the¶ founding partners, Conservation International ad¶ ministers the global program through a CEPF¶ Secretariat.¶ CEPF provides grants for nongovern¶ mental and other private organizations to help protect¶ biodiversity hotspots, Earth’s most biologically¶ rich and threatened areas. The convergence of¶ critical areas for conservation with millions¶ of people who are impoverished and highly¶ dependent on healthy ecosystems is more ev¶ ident in the hotspots than anywhere else.¶ CEPF is unique among funding mechanisms in th¶ at it focuses on biological areas rather than¶ political boundaries and examines conservation th¶ reats on a landscape-scale basis. A fundamental¶ purpose of CEPF is to ensure that civil society is¶ engaged in efforts to conserve biodiversity in¶ the hotspots, and to this end, CEPF provides ci¶ vil society with an agile and flexible funding¶ mechanism complementing funding currently¶ available to government agencies.¶ CEPF promotes working alliances among commun¶ ity groups, nongovernmental organizations¶ (NGOs), government, academic institutions and¶ the private sector, combining unique capacities¶ and eliminating duplication of efforts for a¶ comprehensive approach to conservation. CEPF¶ targets trans-boundary cooperation for areas rich of¶ biological value that straddle national borders¶ or in areas where a regional approach may be more effective than a national approach.¶ A recent, updated analysis reveals the existence of¶ 34 biodiversity hotspots, each holding at least¶ 1,500 endemic plant species, and having lost at¶ least 70 percent of its original habitat extent¶ (Mittermeier¶ et al¶ . 2005). The Caribbean islands qualify as one of these global biodiversity¶ hotspots by virtue of their high endemicity and high degree of threat.¶ The Caribbean Islands Hotspot is exceptionally important for global biodiversity conservation.¶ The hotspot includes important ecosystems, fro¶ m montane cloud forests to coral reefs, and¶ supports populations of unique species amounting to at least 2 percent of the world’s total¶ species.

#### **Another major spill would crush the economy—this assumes BP**

National Commission 11—National Commission, chaired by William Reilly former president of WWF and administrator of the EPA (“The Gulf Oil Disaster and the Future of Offshore Drilling”, 2011, <http://www.oilspillcommission.gov/sites/default/files/documents/DEEPWATER_ReporttothePresident_FINAL.pdf>, zs)

Chapters 4 through 7 lay out the results of our investigation in detail, highlighting the¶ crucial issues we believe must inform policy going forward: the specific engineering and¶ operating choices made in drilling the Macondo well, the attempts to contain and respond¶ to the oil spill, and the impacts of the spill on the region’s natural resources, economy, and¶ people—in the context of the progressive degradation of the Mississippi Delta environment. ¶ Chapters 8 through 10 present our recommendations for reforms in business practices,¶ regulatory oversight, and broader policy concerns. We recognize that the improvements¶ we advocate all come with costs and all will take time to implement. But inaction, as we¶ are deeply aware, runs the risk of real costs, too: in more lost lives, in broad damage to¶ the regional economy and its long-term viability, and in further tens of billions of dollars¶ of avoidable clean-up costs. Indeed, if the clear challenges are not addressed and another¶ disaster happens, the entire offshore energy enterprise is threatened—and with it, the¶ nation’s economy and security. We suggest a better option: build from this tragedy in a¶ way that makes the Gulf more resilient, the country’s energy supplies more secure, our¶ workers safer, and our cherished natural resources better protected.

#### Econ decline causes global conflict - studies

Royal 10 (Jedediah, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction – U.S. Department of Defense, “Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises”, Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, Ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-215)

Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defence behaviour of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modelski and Thompson's (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin. 1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation (Feaver, 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner. 1999). Separately, Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland's (1996, 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that 'future expectation of trade' is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behaviour of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states.4 Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write: The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other. (Blomberg & Hess, 2002. p. 89) Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg, Hess, & Weerapana, 2004), which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. "Diversionary theory" suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag' effect. Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995). and Blomberg, Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in the use of force. In summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflictat systemic, dyadic and national levels.5 This implied connection between integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention.

### 1AC Russia

#### Cuba-Russia relations are increasing and will cause war---boosting US-Cuba relations solves

Inter-American Dialogue 12 (U.S. based think tank for policy analysis, exchange, and communication on issues in Western Hemisphere affairs, “Are External Tensions Entangling Latin American Countries?” http://www.cepr.net/documents/CEPR\_News/LAA120810.pdf)

A Stephen Johnson, senior fellow and director of the Americas Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies: "It may or may not be true that Russia's government is seeking to build resupply bases for its navy in Cuba, Vietnam and the Seychelles islands. While Russian navy officials say 'da,' the foreign ministry says 'nyet.' Similar talk of establishing bases elsewhere, such as Venezuela, has not materialized. In any case, it would not present a direct threat unless such a facility became an entry point for hostile arms similar to the nuclear-tipped missiles that provoked the 1962 crisis. Like any other state, Russia can strike diplomatic agreements to base military units in other countries. On the other hand, it would be a challenge. First, it would rekindle a military relationship that ended when Russia transferred its signals intelligence facility at Lourdes to the Cuban government in 2002. A new base might be a shot in the arm to the Cuban economy, helping the Castro brothers hang on to aspects of their old command economy without going cold turkey for market reforms. A base could also serve as a hub for military weapons sales to other Latin American nations when the region needs help in fighting transnational crime. The Soviet Union fell more than 20 years ago, but Russia still has large military industries and needs to sell arms more than washing machines. Its prime customers would, like Cuba, be in the Bolivarian alliance. Second, a Russian navy station in Cuba might complicate U.S. politics, specifically any plans a U.S. administration might have to hand back Guantanamo Naval Base in the near future, for which Cuba's current government refuses to cash our rent checks. At a time when U.S. Northern and Southern Commands are gearing more toward military support for civilian law enforcement missions, it would reintroduce a strategic deterrence component into joint exercises and training. That might not be a bad thing, but it would argue for more U.S. defense spending on the Western Hemisphere. All of which seems to argue that recent threat trends in the Americas are not very predictive and that certain old alliances won't go easily into the sunset."¶ A Stephen Wilkinson, chairman of the International Institute for the Study of Cuba: "Russia is in military talks with Cuba for three reasons. One is economic, related to Russian investment in Cuban nickel and oil and the need to guarantee protection of these investments. Another factor is geostrategic. Recent events in Syria have confirmed Russian fears of the long-term strategic aims of the United States. The Russians are very aware that the United States and Western Europe have been supporting the rebels in Syria and they see this as an indirect attack upon their interests as Assad provides them with a naval base at Tartus, on the Mediterranean. The third reason is possibly rather more personal, Vladimir Putin has turned his face against Washington since his recent re-election because he perceived a U.S. hand in organizing the protests against him. From Cuba's point of view, having a Russian military base would be a guarantee of security since it would mean that U.S. military action against it would be less likely. If Washington would not wish for Havana to have such an ally, it ought to reconsider its own policy toward the island. At present, the embargo, and especially the Helms Burton Law, makes it sensible for the Cuban government to seek alliances with as many powers as possible in order to protect itself. U.S. military presence in Latin America has grown in recent years. There are now 24 bases including two new ones in Chile and Argentina. Seven bases in Colombia are being expanded. The justification for this expansion is the war on drugs and for humanitarian intervention purposes. However, it should come as no surprise that this is not the way that Cuba or its closest allies such as Hugo Chávez or Evo Morales view them. They see the bases as potential threats to their independence and sovereignty and a sign that Washington's hegemonic designs on the region are very much alive."¶ A Wayne S. Smith, senior fellow and director of the Cuba Project at the Center for International Policy: "Given the history of the 1962 U.S.-Soviet missile crisis, for the Russians now to propose exploring with the Cubans the setting up of naval bases on the island would seem a rather maladroit idea. The United States made it clear in 1962 that the positioning of offensive nuclear missiles on the island was unacceptable and demanded that they be withdrawn. The world has never been so close to an allout nuclear war. Fortunately, both Kennedy and Khrushchev showed themselves to be sensible men. They reached an understanding under which Khrushchev agreed to withdraw the missiles and Kennedy gave assurances that the United States would not invade Cuba. Subsequently, without informing the United States, the Soviets began building a submarine base on the island, but when it was made clear to them that the United States would consider this a violation of the Kennedy-Khrushchev understanding of 1962, work on the base was quietly halted and never resumed. The United States should of course oppose the positioning of Russian bases in Cuba today, as should the other countries of the hemisphere. They would serve no reasonable purpose and could only unnecessarily add to tensions. The United States has not increased its military presence in Latin America. There is no reason for the Russians to do so."

#### Increased Cuba-Russia relations causes war

Richter 08 (Paul, Staff Writer for New York Times, “Moscow-Havana ties worry U.S.” http://articles.latimes.com/2008/sep/01/world/fg-usrussia1)

But at a time when Russia has intervened forcefully in Georgia and is extending the global reach of its rebuilt military, some senior officials fear it may not be only bluster.¶ Russia "has strategic ties to Cuba again, or at least, that's where they're going," a senior U.S. official said recently, speaking, like others, on condition of anonymity because of the sensitive implications of the assessments.¶ The officials said they doubted the Russians would risk stationing nuclear bombers on Cuba. But some believe that Moscow might seek to restore its once-energetic intelligence cooperation with Havana, and to resume limited military cooperation, possibly including refueling stops for aircraft and warships.¶ In the current environment, such contacts would make U.S. officials uneasy, serving as a reminder of a military relationship between Havana and Moscow that stretched from the Cuban Revolution in 1959 until a weakened, post-Soviet Russia finally closed a massive electronic intelligence complex in Lourdes near Havana in 2001.¶ One senior military officer said a return of Russian ships or planes could force additional U.S. deployments in the region. But the Bush administration and Pentagon declined to comment publicly on the implications.¶ "It is very Cold War retro," said a government official. "The topic could be reminiscent of the Cuban missile crisis, and that is a chapter that people don't want to revisit."¶ The Russian Defense Ministry dismissed a report in the newspaper Izvestia in July that quoted an unidentified Russian official as saying the government intended to begin basing Tupolev Tu-160 Blackjack and Tupolev Tu-95 Bear nuclear bombers in Cuba.¶ However, the report was taken seriously enough in Washington that Gen. Norton A. Schwartz, the new Air Force chief of staff, said during his Senate confirmation hearing at the time that sending the bombers would cross a "red line in the sand."

#### The plan establishes a long-term framework for normalizing relations

Lanier 13—Adam Lanier, UNC School of Law (“In Deepwater: Cuba, Offshore Drilling, and Political Brinkmanship”, 2013, Lexis Nexis)

IV. Recommendations¶ The development of Cuba's offshore oil resources has sparked the interest of a number of academics, foreign policy think tanks, and environmental activist groups. n148 This section of the note will explore several of the more effective options while keeping an eye toward practicality. n149 Due to the disagreement over the direction U.S. policy should take, as evidenced by the various legislative proposals introduced over the past several years, it is unlikely that U.S. policy toward Cuba will change overnight. n150 Nevertheless, making small changes that are in the best interest of both Cuba and the United States, such as loosening restrictions on the ability of private companies to assist Cuba's offshore drilling efforts, can help provide a long-term framework for the normalization of relations on mutually acceptable terms.

#### Normalizing relations with Cuba crowds out Russia

Blank 09 (Stephen, Research Professor of National Security Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, “Russia in Latin America: Geopolitical Games in the US’s Neighborhood,” pdf)

The only way in which Russian policy truly threatens the US and Latin America is its military and intelligence support for Chavez and similar leaders. This support is passed on to insurgents while strengthening Chavez and his allies. Adequate responses to such threats are inherently economic and political, and only military as a last resort. ¶ Washington can do much more to facilitate security in Latin America: regenerating its own economy; simultaneously opening up trade markets and eliminating barriers to Latin American exports; enhancing multilateralism and interoperability among defense forces as requested by Latin American militaries; and beginning the normalization of Cuba.¶ Havana is no longer the threat it was, Venezuela has claimed that dubious honor. Rehabilitating Cuba, given that Castro’s days are clearly numbered, would take the air out of Chavez’s balloon; it is quite clear that Havana would probably welcome a path towards better relations with the US, especially the economic benefits they would inevitably bring. A policy with a more symbolically important impact upon Latin America is currently difficult to imagine.¶ Nonetheless, there should be no illusion that the security problems that plague this region are easily overcome, quite the opposite. But that is all the more reason why the US cannot ignore the area and let it drift to Moscow, Tehran, and Beijin for want of a better alternative. That outcome would only confirm once again that in world politics, there is no such thing as benign neglect. Instead neglect is malign and engenders negative results for the negligent state along with those neglected. The policies of the Bush administration allowed Russia to gain a foothold in Latin American politics, a result of Washington’s negligence; under President Obama, the US should reverse those outcomes and demonstrate what liberal democracy in action can truly accomplish.

#### Russian expansion spurs a new Cold War and proxy conflicts

Walle 12 (Walter, Research Associate at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, “Russia Turns to the South for Military and Economic Alliances,” <http://www.coha.org/russia-turns-to-the-south-for-military-and-economic-alliances/>)

Quite clearly, Russia’s interest in Latin America is escalating. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, argued in his article, “The New Stage of Development of Russian-Latin American Relations,” that there is great attractiveness in establishing bilateral relations, especially when three of the top twenty emerging economies -Mexico, Brazil and Argentina- are in Latin America.[23] Lavrov has also stated that the Russian Federation has an interest in joining the Inter-American Development Bank, perhaps a move to better accommodate Russian interests in the region, while at the same time neutralizing American influence.¶ Demonstrably, Russia has been developing cooperative relationships with prominent organizational bodies of the region, such as the OAS (Organization of American States), and has ratified visa-free travel agreements with countries like Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru, Brazil, Chile, and Argentina. In his article, Lavrov argues that Russia’s intention behind quests for partnerships is the establishment of non-ideologized relationships with Latin American countries, relationships that could be of mutual benefit to all parties involved.¶ However, the Russian stance on Latin America ultimately may be cause for apprehension. The establishment of bilateral, cordial relations between Russia and Latin American countries could evolve to a proxy, neo-Cold War scenario. If the situation in the regions worsens, some countries would be funded and supported by the U.S., while others, including several members of Latin America’s “New Left”, would become the major beneficiaries of Moscow. An analogy of such practice is the Georgia – Russia crisis that surfaced in August of 2008. During this brief war, the U.S. sent military aid to Georgia[24] on warships to territory Russia considers its “backyard” (i.e. the Caucasus and the Black Sea), infuriating Moscow. A month after the conflict erupted, ostensibly in retaliation, Russia sent two Tu-160 bombers to conduct military exercises with Washington’s least favorite nation in Latin America: Venezuela[25]. More importantly, in November of 2008 Moscow conducted war games with Caracas, in which a small Russian fleet was sent to the Caribbean to participate in joint naval maneuvers with the Venezuelan navy.[26] This was a powerful symbolic act: as it was the first time that Russian warships had visited the Caribbean since the Cuban Missile Crisis.¶ In the wake of the post-Georgia conflict, such joint military maneuvers between Russia and Venezuela were revitalized, and helped to build up the tensions between Washington and Moscow, sending strong signals of a Cold War revival. Furthermore, in the aftermath of the declarations of independence by the breakaway regions of Georgia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Venezuela[27] and Nicaragua[28] were alone among Latin American countries in recognizing the independence of the new republics.

#### That causes miscalculation

Orozco 08 (Jose, Correspondent for Christian Science Monitor, “Cold war echo: Russian military maneuvers with Venezuela,” http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/2008/0912/p01s05-woam.html)

The last time a Russian Navy ship plied the azure waters of the Caribbean for major joint maneuvers with an anti-US country was during the cold war.¶ But in a move out of Cuban leader Fidel Castro's historical playbook, Venezuela's Hugo Chávez announced this week that his nation will host four Russian warships and 1,000 troops in November for joint military exercises.¶ That was followed Wednesday by the arrival in Venezuela of two Russian long-range bombers.¶ Although Latin American leaders so far have shrugged off the moves as another act of bravado in Mr. Chávez's push against what he calls "Yankee hegemony," some diplomats and US officials see the potential for real trouble.¶ The US typically ignores the leftist leader's angry tirades, and is playing down the news.¶ Still, an extensive military relationship between Venezuela and Russia could heighten tensions and signal the start of a new regional cold war.¶ "This is a risky step that could provoke the US," says retired Navy Vice Admiral and former Vice Minister of Defense Rafael Huizi Clavier. "Any incident, any error, could bring problems." This week, Russia announced that it will send a naval squadron, including the nuclear-powered missile cruiser Peter the Great, as well as long-range patrol planes for the upcoming joint exercises with Venezuela.

#### Extinction

Helfand and Pastore 9 [Ira Helfand, M.D., and John O. Pastore, M.D., are past presidents of Physicians for Social Responsibility. March 31, 2009, “U.S.-Russia nuclear war still a threat”, http://www.projo.com/opinion/contributors/content/CT\_pastoreline\_03-31-09\_EODSCAO\_v15.bbdf23.html]

President Obama and Russian President Dimitri Medvedev are scheduled to Wednesday in London during the G-20 summit. They must not let the current economic crisis keep them from focusing on one of the greatest threats confronting humanity: the danger of nuclear war. Since the end of the Cold War, many have acted as though the danger of nuclear war has ended. It has not. There remain in the world more than 20,000 nuclear weapons. Alarmingly, more than 2,000 of these weapons in the U.S. and Russian arsenals remain on ready-alert status, commonly known as hair-trigger alert. They can be fired within five minutes and reach targets in the other country 30 minutes later. Just one of these weapons can destroy a city. A war involving a substantial number would cause devastation on a scale unprecedented in human history. A study conducted by Physicians for Social Responsibility in 2002 showed that if only 500 of the Russian weapons on high alert exploded over our cities, 100 million Americans would die in the first 30 minutes. An attack of this magnitude also would destroy the entire economic, communications and transportation infrastructure on which we all depend. Those who survived the initial attack would inhabit a nightmare landscape with huge swaths of the country blanketed with radioactive fallout and epidemic diseases rampant. They would have no food, no fuel, no electricity, no medicine, and certainly no organized health care. In the following months it is likely the vast majority of the U.S. population would die. Recent studies by the eminent climatologists Toon and Robock have shown that such a war would have a huge and immediate impact on climate world wide. If all of the warheads in the U.S. and Russian strategic arsenals were drawn into the conflict, the firestorms they caused would loft 180 million tons of soot and debris into the upper atmosphere — blotting out the sun. Temperatures across the globe would fall an average of 18 degrees Fahrenheit to levels not seen on earth since the depth of the last ice age, 18,000 years ago. Agriculture would stop, eco-systems would collapse, and many species, including perhaps our own, would become extinct. It is common to discuss nuclear war as a low-probabillity event. But is this true? We know of five occcasions during the last 30 years when either the U.S. or Russia believed it was under attack and prepared a counter-attack. The most recent of these near misses occurred after the end of the Cold War on Jan. 25, 1995, when the Russians mistook a U.S. weather rocket launched from Norway for a possible attack. Jan. 25, 1995, was an ordinary day with no major crisis involving the U.S. and Russia. But, unknown to almost every inhabitant on the planet, a misunderstanding led to the potential for a nuclear war. The ready alert status of nuclear weapons that existed in 1995 remains in place today.

### 1AC Hegemony

#### Hegemony is sustainable – but the US must walk carefully – policy choices that endorse multilateral leadership are key

Beckley 2012, Michael Beckley, PHD Columbia, assistant professor of political science at Tufts University specializing in U.S. and Chinese foreign policy, 2012, “The Unipolar Era: Why American Power Persists and China’s Rise Is Limited”, PDF, <https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&ved=0CDkQFjAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Facademiccommons.columbia.edu%2Fcatalog%2Fac%3A146399&ei=I1mZUaOnMMLk0gH9iICoCw&usg=AFQjCNGKp8jw7t-cvRknlrP0qcv6Z7M41w&sig2=EcwCKI0jGPs3NkMrxYYY5g&bvm=bv.46751780,d.dmQ>

The growing consensus in U.S. academic and policymaking circles is that unipolarity is a temporary aberration that soon will be swept away. The most recent National Intelligence Council report, for example, claims that “the international system...will be almost unrecognizable by 2025 owing to the rise of emerging powers” and “will be a global multipolar one.”6 Among academics, “it is widely perceived that the international political system is in flux and that the post-­‐ Cold War era of American preeminence is winding down.”7 Book stores are filled with titles such as The Post-­‐American World, The End of the American Era, When China Rules the World, and Becoming China’s Bitch. And opinion polls show that pluralities of people in most countries believe that China is already the world’s dominant economic power.8 If this conventional wisdom is correct, then the United States faces an extraordinary challenge. The Argument In the pages that follow, I argue that such declinist beliefs are exaggerated and that the alternative perspective more accurately captures the dynamics of the current unipolar era. First, I show that the United States is not in decline. Across most indicators of national power, the United States has maintained, and in some areas increased, its lead over other countries since 1991. Declinists often characterize the expansion of globalization and U.S. hegemonic burdens as sufficient conditions for U.S. relative decline. Yet, over the last two decades American economic and military dominance endured while globalization and U.S. hegemony increased significantly. Second, I find that U.S. hegemony is profitable in certain areas. The United States delegates part of the burden of maintaining international security to others while channeling its own resources, and some of its allies resources, into enhancing its own military dominance. It imposes punitive trade measures against others while deterring such measures against its own industries. And it manipulates global technology flows in ways that enhance the technological and military capabilities of itself and allies. Such a privileged position has not provoked significant opposition from other countries. In fact, balancing against the United States has declined steadily since the end of the Cold War. Third, I conclude that globalization benefits the United States more than other countries. Globalization causes innovative activity to concentrate in areas where it is done most efficiently. Because the United States is already wealthy and innovative, it sucks up capital, technology, and people from the rest of the world. Paradoxically, therefore, the diffusion of technology around the globe helps sustain a concentration of technological and military capabilities in the United States. Taken together, these results suggest that unipolarity will be an enduring feature of international relations, not a passing moment in time, but a deeply embedded material condition that will persist for the foreseeable future. The United States may decline because of some unforeseen disaster, bad policies, or from domestic decay. But the two chief features of the current international system – American hegemony and globalization – both reinforce unipolarity. For scholars, this conclusion implies that the study of unipolarity should become a major research agenda, at least on par with the study of power transitions and hegemonic decline. For policymakers, the results of this study suggest that the United States should not retrench from the world, but rather continue to integrate with the world economy and sustain a significant diplomatic and military presence abroad.

#### Plan solves 2 internal links

#### A. International Credibility through Latin America engagement

Benjamin-Alvadaro 6 (Jonathan, Report for the Cuban Research Institute, Florida International University, PhD, Professor of Political Science at University of Nebraska at Omaha, Director of the Intelligence Community Centers of Academic Excellence Program at UNO, Treasurer of the American Political Science Association, “The Current Status and Future Prospects for Oil Exploration in Cuba: A Special,” <http://cri.fiu.edu/research/commissioned-reports/oil-cuba-alvarado.pdf>)

Given that there are no formal diplomatic of economic relations between the governments of the United States and Cuba, the level of interest has grown significantly in the 3 years due primarily to three reasons in the following interest areas: energy security interests; broader regional strategic; and purely economic interests. First, the energy security interests in the potential of Cuban oil – although it really would not minimize the immediacy of an American energy crisis – is seen as possible if only partial remedy to energy supply concerns. Second, as Cuba, in part because of the increasing number of oil partnerships furthers its diplomatic and economic ties to with countries like Venezuela, China, Brazil and members of the European Union it may prove to provide Cuba for a sufficient buffer against U.S. opposition as it solidifies it economic and diplomatic role in the region. This is important inasmuch as there is a de facto trend in the Americas that clearly disavows and attempts to minimize the influence of the United States in the region, and with the growing demands on the world economy by China, it stands to reason that Cuba may assume an increasing stature that almost potentially lessens the presence of American influence in Cuban and hence regional affairs. Finally, and as demonstrated by the presence of American oil interests in the February 2006 U.S.- Cuban Energy Summit in Mexico City, there may be interest in cooperating in joint venture projects, and by extension assisting in the long-term development in Cuba’s oil industry. ¶ To accomplish this task the report seeks to lay out some national security policy considerations applying strategic thought to what I will term “Post-Oil” Cuba – a Cuba that has a small but vibrant and growing oil and gas production capacity with extensive relations with a number of partners, and an increasingly positive outlook toward addressing energy and economic development questions that have plagued the Castro regime since the Cuban Revolution.3¶ The primary consideration is to determine the present state of Cuban energy and what possibilities exist that would be available to American foreign policy decision makers and business interests as the relations with Cuba evolve over the coming years.4 This is important because any realistic appraisal of how Cuba is to take advantage of its oil bonanza involves the United States. Previous research in this area has clearly laid out the scope and objectives of Cuban energy development schemes in the period since the demise of Cuba’s favorable trade arrangements with the former Soviet Union. Recently, and as a result of the oil discovery and Cuba’s energy arrangement with the government of Hugo Chavez in Venezuela there is renewed interest in Havana’s energy policies. Most of that analysis has been focused on concrete possibilities where there can be cooperation in the energy field between these two neighbors. Specifically, the work has looked at areas for the convergence of energy interests as they apply to the near- and long-term energy development scenarios facing both countries. Myers Jaffe and Soligo have addressed this possibility by looking at the potential to increase diversification and dispersion of energy resources. This is an important consideration when one takes into consideration that well over one-third of all oil refining capacity resides on or near the Houston shipping channel. The potential negative impact on America’s refining capacity following Hurricane Rita5 made a significant impression on oil industry analysts for the necessity of diversifying the location of these vital national resources. The potential of viewing Cuba as a “staging area” for American oil storage and refining is plausible because of the proximity of the island. The also becomes more attractive because of the growing climatic concerns over the uncertain security of oil resources in the Gulf region as clearly demonstrated by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005. While it is true that Venezuela has initiated an investment of $1 billion dollars to bring the Cienfuegos refinery online, there are still many other possibilities open and available to American companies, as well as a growing number of foreign firms.6 Additionally, Venezuela remains the fourth largest importer of oil to the United States and one can surmise that the existing trade arrangements between the U.S. and Venezuela will remain intact, the evolution of the Bolivarian revolution under Chavez and a growing Chinese presence in the region notwithstanding. Additionally, pursuing such a path would allow United States policymakers to take advantage of what Cuba has to offer in the following areas: domestic technical capabilities; continuing human capital development; strategic positioning in the Caribbean, and an improved diplomatic stature. Cuba, by any measure, possesses a largely untapped technical capacity owing to advanced training and education in the core mathematic and scientific areas. This was clearly demonstrated by its attempt to develop a nuclear energy capability in the 1980s and 1990s whereby thousands of Cubans pursued highly technical career paths leaving Cuba with among the highest ratios of scientists and engineers to the general population in all of the Americas. Moreover, the foundation of Cuba’s vaunted public education system remains intact and increased investment under various scenarios suggests that Cuba will continue to produce a welleducated workforce that will be critical to its future economic vitality. This raises an important consideration that being the role that Cuba will play in the region in the 21st century. It suffices to say that Cuba remains the strategically important state by virtue of its geographical location alone, in efforts against drug and human trafficking and related national and regional security matters. The extent to which a stable Cuban government has cooperated with the U.S. in drug interdiction efforts in the past suggests that the results from improved diplomatic relations between neighbors would have the effect of improving national security concerns related to terrorist activity, illicit weapons transfers and the like. Ultimately, a successful normalization of relations between the U.S. and Cuba in these areas may well enhance and stabilize regional relations that could possibly lessen (or at a minimum, balancing) fears of a Chinese incursion in hemispheric affairs. To lessen those fears it may be useful to review the present structure of joint-venture projects in the energy sector in Cuba to ascertain the feasibility and possible success of such an undertaking become available to American firms. Moreover, it is interesting to note that U.S. firms in the agriculture sector have successfully negotiated and consummated sales to Cuba totaling more than $1 billion dollars over the past four years under conditions that are less than optimal circumstances but have well-served the commercial interests of all parties involved.

#### Specifically US engagement is critical to prevent global war spurring from Latin America

Rochlin 94 James Francis “Discovering the Americas” (Professor of Political Science, University of British Columbia Okanagan p. 130-1)

While there were economic motivations for Canadian policy in Central America, security concerns were perhaps more impotant. Canada possessed an interest in promoting stability in the face of potential decline of US hegemony in the Americas. Perceptions of declining US influence in the region – which had some credibility in 1979-84 due to wildly inequitable divisions of wealth in some US client state in Latin America, in addition to **political repression, underdevelopment, mounting external debt, anti-american sentiment** produced by decades of subjugation to US strategic and economic interest and so on – were linked to the prospect of explosive events occurring in the hemisphere. Hence, the Cental American imbroglio was viewed as a fuse which could ignite a cataclysmic process thoughout the whole region. Analysts at the time worried that, in a worst-case scenario, instability created by a regional war, beginning in Central America and spreading elsewhere in Latin Ameica, might preoccupy Washington to the extent that the United States would be unable to perform adequately its important hegemonic role in the international arena – a concern expressed by the director of research for Canada’s Standing Committee Report on Central America. It was feared that such a predicament could generate increased global instability and perhaps **even a hegemonic** war. This is one of the motivation which led Canada to become involved in efforts at regional conflict resolution, such as Contradora, as will be seen in the next chapter.

#### B. Chinese influence

Dowd 12 (Alan, Senior Fellow with the American Security Council Foundation, “Crisis in the America's,” <http://www.ascfusa.org/content_pages/view/crisisinamericas>)

Focused on military operations in the Middle East, nuclear threats in Iran and North Korea, and the global threat of terrorism, U.S. policymakers have neglected a growing challenge right here in the Western Hemisphere: the expanding influence and reach of China.¶ Eyeing energy resources to keep its economy humming, China is engaged in a flurry of investing and spending in Latin America.¶ In Costa Rica, China is funding a $1.24-billion upgrade of the country’s oil refinery; bankrolling an $83-million soccer stadium; backing infrastructure and telecommunications improvements; and pouring millions into a new police academy.¶ In Colombia, China is planning a massive “dry canal” to link the country’s Pacific and Atlantic coasts by rail. At either terminus, there will be Chinese ports; in between, there will be Chinese assembly facilities, logistics operations and distribution plants; and on the Pacific side, there will be dedicated berths to ship Colombian coal outbound to China.¶ In mid-January, a Chinese-built oil rig arrived in Cuba to begin drilling in Cuba’s swath of the Gulf of Mexico. Reuters reports that Spanish, Russian, Malaysian and Norwegian firms will use the rig to extract Cuban oil. For now, China is focusing on onshore oil extraction in Cuba.¶ New offshore discoveries will soon catapult Brazil into a top-five global oil producer. With some 38 billion barrels of recoverable oil off its coast, Brazil expects to pump 4.9 million barrels per day by 2020, as the Washington Times reports, and China has used generous loans to position itself as the prime beneficiary of Brazilian oil. China’s state-run oil and banking giants have inked technology-transfer, chemical, energy and real-estate deals with Brazil. Plus, as the Times details, China came to the rescue of Brazil’s main oil company when it sought financing for its massive drilling plans, pouring $10 billion into the project. A study in Joint Force Quarterly (JFQ) adds that Beijing plunked down $3.1 billion for a slice of Brazil’s vast offshore oil fields.¶ The JFQ study reveals just how deep and wide Beijing is spreading its financial influence in Latin America: $28 billion in loans to Venezuela; a $16.3-billion commitment to develop Venezuelan oil reserves; $1 billion for Ecuadoran oil; $4.4 billion to develop Peruvian mines; $10 billion to help Argentina modernize its rail system; $3.1 billion to purchase Argentina’s petroleum company outright. The New York Times adds that Beijing has lent Ecuador $1 billion to build a hydroelectric plant.¶ There is good and bad to Beijing’s increased interest and investment in the Western Hemisphere. Investment fuels development, and much of Latin America is happily accelerating development in the economic, trade, technology and infrastructure spheres. But China’s riches come with strings.¶ For instance, in exchange for Chinese development funds and loans, Venezuela agreed to increase oil shipments to China from 380,000 barrels per day to one million barrels per day. It’s worth noting that the Congressional Research Service has reported concerns in Washington that Hugo Chavez might try to supplant his U.S. market with China. Given that Venezuela pumps an average of 1.5 million barrels of oil per day for the U.S.—or about 11 percent of net oil imports—the results would be devastating for the U.S.¶ That brings us to the security dimension of China’s checkbook diplomacy in the Western Hemisphere.¶ Officials with the U.S. Southern Command conceded as early as 2006 that Beijing had “approached every country in our area of responsibility” and provided military exchanges, aid or training to Ecuador, Jamaica, Bolivia, Cuba, Chile and Venezuela.¶ The JFQ study adds that China has “an important and growing presence in the region’s military institutions.” Most Latin American nations, including Mexico, “send officers to professional military education courses in the PRC.” In Ecuador, Venezuela and Bolivia, Beijing has begun to sell “sophisticated hardware…such as radars and K-8 and MA-60 aircraft.” The JFQ report concludes, ominously, that Chinese defense firms “are likely to leverage their experience and a growing track record for their goods to expand their market share in the region, with the secondary consequence being that those purchasers will become more reliant on the associated Chinese logistics, maintenance, and training infrastructures that support those products.”¶ Put it all together, and the southern flank of the United States is exposed to a range of new security challenges.¶ To be sure, much of this is a function of China’s desire to secure oil markets. But there’s more at work here than China’s thirst for oil. Like a global chess match, China is probing Latin America and sending a message that just as Washington has trade and military ties in China’s neighborhood, China is developing trade and military ties in America’s neighborhood.¶ This is a direct challenge to U.S. primacy in the region—a challenge that must be answered.¶ First, Washington needs to relearn an obvious truth—that China’s rulers do not share America’s values—and needs to shape and conduct its China policy in that context.¶ Beijing has no respect for human rights. Recall that in China, an estimated 3-5 million people are rotting away in laogai slave-labor camps, many of them “guilty” of political dissent or religious activity; democracy activists are rounded up and imprisoned; freedom of speech and religion and assembly do not exist; and internal security forces are given shoot-to-kill orders in dealing with unarmed citizens. Indeed, Beijing viewed the Arab Spring uprisings not as an impetus for political reform, but as reason “to launch its harshest crackdown on dissent in at least a decade,” according to Director of National Intelligence James Clapper.¶ In short, the ends always justify the means in Beijing. And that makes all the difference when it comes to foreign and defense policy. As Reagan counseled during the Cold War, “There is no true international security without respect for human rights.”¶ Second, the U.S. must stop taking the Western Hemisphere for granted, and instead must reengage in its own neighborhood economically, politically and militarily.¶ That means no more allowing trade deals—and the partners counting on them—to languish. Plans for a hemispheric free trade zone have faltered and foundered. The trade-expansion agreements with Panama and Colombia were left in limbo for years, before President Obama finally signed them into law in 2011.¶ Reengagement means reviving U.S. diplomacy. The Wall Street Journal reports that due to political wrangling in Washington, the State Department position focused on the Western Hemisphere has been staffed by an interim for nearly a year, while six Western Hemisphere ambassadorial posts (Uruguay, Venezuela, Ecuador, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Barbados) remain empty.¶ Reengagement means reversing plans to slash defense spending. The Joint Forces Command noted in 2008 that China has “a deep respect for U.S. military power.” We cannot overstate how important this has been to keeping the peace. But with the United States in the midst of massive military retrenchment, one wonders how long that reservoir of respect will last.¶ Reengagement also means revitalizing security ties. A good model to follow might be what’s happening in China’s backyard. To deter China and prevent an accidental war, the U.S. is reviving its security partnerships all across the Asia-Pacific region. Perhaps it’s time to do the same in Latin America. We should remember that many Latin American countries—from Mexico and Panama to Colombia and Chile—border the Pacific. Given Beijing’s actions, it makes sense to bring these Latin American partners on the Pacific Rim into the alliance of alliances that is already stabilizing the Asia-Pacific region.¶ Finally, all of this needs to be part of a revived Monroe Doctrine.¶ Focusing on Chinese encroachment in the Americas, this “Monroe Doctrine 2.0” would make it clear to Beijing that the United States welcomes China’s efforts to conduct trade in the Americas but discourages any claims of control—implied or explicit—by China over territories, properties or facilities in the Americas. In addition, Washington should make it clear to Beijing that the American people would look unfavorably upon the sale of Chinese arms or the basing of Chinese advisors or military assets in the Western Hemisphere.¶ In short, what it was true in the 19th and 20th centuries must remain true in the 21st: There is room for only one great power in the Western Hemisphere.

#### Increased influence makes a Chinese invasion of Taiwan inevitable

Ferguson 12 (Robbie, Researcher at Royal Society for the Arts, Featured Contributor at International Business Times, Former Conference & Research Assistant at Security Watch, Former Researcher at University College London, Master of Science, China in the International Arena, The University of Glasgow, “The Chinese Challenge to the Monroe Doctrine,” <http://www.e-ir.info/2012/07/23/does-chinese-growth-in-latin-america-threaten-american-interests/>)

Taiwan – domestic, or foreign policy?¶ China’s goals in the region amount to more than the capture of natural resources. Although the People’s Republic of China considers resolution of the Taiwan issue to be a domestic issue, it is with some irony that one of China’s main foreign policy goals is to isolate Taipei internationally. The PRC and the ROC compete directly for international recognition among all the states in the world. . Nowhere is this more evident than in Latin America, where 12 of the 23 nations that still have official diplomatic relations with the ROC reside.¶ The historical background¶ Following the mainland Communist victory in the Chinese Civil War in 1949, the nationalist Kuomintang retreated to the island of Formosa (Taiwan) where it continued to claim to be the legitimate government of all of China. In June 1950 the United States intervened by placing its 7th fleet in the Taiwan straits to stop a conclusive military resolution to the civil war and slowly the battlefield became primarily political, concerned with legitimacy.¶ When the United Nations was formed in 1945, the Republic of China (ROC) became one of the five permanent members of the Security Council. This gave the ROC a de facto advantage over the PRC in attaining recognition from other nation states; particularly as the diplomatic clout of the hegemonic United States supported its position as the true representative of the Chinese people, until the rapprochement of the 1970s, when the Nixon administration wished to improve ties with the de facto rulers of China in order to exploit the Sino-Soviet split. UN Resolution 2758 granted the ’China seat’ to the PRC at the expense of the ROC who were in effect exiled from the organization, and the famous 1972 visit of President Nixon to China further added legitimacy to the communist regime. All this resulted in a thawing of world opinion, and gradually as the durability and permanence of the PRC regime became ingrained, countries began switching their diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing.¶ The economics of international recognition¶ In the Americas, the PRC had international recognition and longstanding support from ideological allies such as Cuba. However, the ROC has maintained more diplomatic support in the Americas than any other region, mainly due to the small nature of the states involved and the importance of Taiwanese aid to their economies. Li notes that “from the late 1980s to the early 1990s, roughly 10 percent of Taiwan’s direct foreign investment (FDI) went to Latin America and the Caribbean,” [51] highlighting the concerted effort made in the region. Economic solidarity is increasingly important to the formation of the Taiwan-Latin America relationship, for two reasons. The first is that for Latin American states, the decision of which China to support is less ideological and political than it ever has been; which makes the decision a straight up economic zero-sum choice. The second is that Latin America is home to natural resources which are of great significance to the hungry growing economies of the PRC and the ROC regardless of international recognition.¶ However, while the decision is not political for Latin American countries, for Taiwan, every country which switches its recognition to the PRC damages its legitimacy as a nation state in the international arena. The Table below shows the designation of diplomatic recognition in the region in 2008.¶ Countries Recognising the PRC (China)Countries Recognising the ROC (Taiwan)Central AmericaMexico, Costa RicaEl Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, PanamaCaribbeanAntigua & Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Cuba, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Suriname, Trinidad & TobagoBelize, Dominican Republic, Haiti, St Kitts & Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent & the GrenadinesSouth AmericaArgentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Uruguay, VenezuelaParaguay¶ On the other hand, for the PRC, every state which withdraws its support for the ROC takes it one step closer to being in a position where it can resolve the ‘Taiwan issue’ unilaterally. Subsequently, undermining Taiwan is of the utmost importance to China, and it has taken to ‘outbidding’ Taiwan in offers of foreign aid, a strategy made possible by the decline in aid from the defunct Soviet Union, and the West, which is pre occupied with terrorism and the Middle East. Li notes that “the region’s leaders have turned to Asia for help to promote trade and financial assistance, and consequently played the PRC and Taiwan against each other.” [53] Despite its smaller size, Taiwan has fared remarkably well in this bidding war; focusing its aid investments on infrastructure such as stadiums in St Kitts & Nevis for the Cricket World Cup in 2007.¶ However, even Taiwan‘s economy can be put under strain by the seemingly relentless stream of foreign aid which has brought only debateable and mild gains to the Taiwanese cause. This has contributed to the PRC picking off the few remaining supporters of the ROC – take for example, the Dominican case.¶ In early 2004, Commonwealth of Dominica asked Taipei for a $58 million aid, which is unrelated to public welfare. The Caribbean nation had relied on Taiwan to develop its agriculture-based economy since 1983. Diplomatic relationship was soon broken after Taipei turned down the request. [54]¶ This incident showcased the fact that in economic terms, the PRC is winning the battle for Latin America.¶ Political strategies of the PRC¶ In political terms too; the PRC is in an advantageous position, thanks in part again to its position within the UN. While it can be argued that China “provides incentives but does not threaten harm to induce countries to defect from recognizing Taiwan,” [55] the reality is that the use of force and direct harm are not the only means available to an economic entity as powerful as China. It refuses to maintain official relations with any state that recognises the ROC; an action which can be quite prohibitive to the country being able to take advantage of the growing Chinese market. Although Domínguez suggests that the PRC “has not been punitive toward those states that still recognize the Republic of China (Taiwan),” [56] the legitimacy of this claim has to be brought into question – for example “in June 1996, China fought the extension of the UN mission in Haiti, to punish the Caribbean nation for its appeal for UN acceptance of Taiwan.” [57] This incident showed that China is prepared to use its global clout to play spoiler and apply indirect pressure on countries to adopt its position. Similarly, China’s experience with one-party rule has taught it the importance of party-to-party relations in addition to state-to-state relations, further cementing the PRC by establishing a relationship based on goodwill and common understanding. Indeed by the start of 1998 “the CCP had established relations with almost all major political parties in the countries that were Taiwan’s diplomatic allies in Latin America,” [58] further isolating the ROC.¶ The effect on American interests¶ Were the ROC to be deserted by its remaining allies in Latin America, the USA would be disadvantaged in attempting to maintain the status quo across the Taiwan Strait. A Taiwan that was not recognised by any state from the Americas, or Europe (with the exception of the Vatican) would not be seen as a genuine sovereign entity whose defence would be more important than the upkeep of good relations between China and the West. As China’s economic and political position in the world improves vis-à-vis both America and Taiwan, so might its ambitions. The U.S.A might find itself in a position where it could no longer withstand the diplomatic pressure to allow the PRC to conclude a settlement on Taiwan, perhaps by force.

#### Draws in the US and causes extinction – impact defense is out dated

Lowther 3/16 William, Taipei Times, citing a report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 3/16/13, “Taiwan could spark nuclear war: report,” <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2013/03/16/2003557211>

Taiwan is the most likely potential crisis that could trigger a nuclear war between China and the US, a new academic report concludes.¶ “Taiwan remains the single most plausible and dangerous source of tension and conflict between the US and China,” says the 42-page report by the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).¶ Prepared by the CSIS’ Project on Nuclear Issues and resulting from a year-long study, the report emphasizes that Beijing continues to be set on a policy to prevent Taiwan’s independence, while at the same time the US maintains the capability to come to Taiwan’s defense.¶ “Although tensions across the Taiwan Strait have subsided since both Taipei and Beijing embraced a policy of engagement in 2008, the situation remains combustible, complicated by rapidly diverging cross-strait military capabilities and persistent political disagreements,” the report says.¶ In a footnote, it quotes senior fellow at the US Council on Foreign Relations Richard Betts describing Taiwan as “the main potential flashpoint for the US in East Asia.”¶ The report also quotes Betts as saying that neither Beijing nor Washington can fully control developments that might ignite a Taiwan crisis.¶ “This is a classic recipe for surprise, miscalculation and uncontrolled escalation,” Betts wrote in a separate study of his own.¶ The CSIS study says: “For the foreseeable future Taiwan is the contingency in which nuclear weapons would most likely become a major factor, because the fate of the island is intertwined both with the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party and the reliability of US defense commitments in the Asia-Pacific region.”¶ Titled Nuclear Weapons and US-China Relations, the study says disputes in the East and South China seas appear unlikely to lead to major conflict between China and the US, but they do “provide kindling” for potential conflict between the two nations because the disputes implicate a number of important regional interests, including the interests of treaty allies of the US.¶ The danger posed by flashpoints such as Taiwan, the Korean Peninsula and maritime demarcation disputes is magnified by the potential for mistakes, the study says.¶ “Although Beijing and Washington have agreed to a range of crisis management mechanisms, such as the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement and the establishment of a direct hotline between the Pentagon and the Ministry of Defense, the bases for miscommunication and misunderstanding remain and draw on deep historical reservoirs of suspicion,” the report says.¶ For example, it says, it is unclear whether either side understands what kinds of actions would result in a military or even nuclear response by the other party.¶ To make things worse, “neither side seems to believe the other’s declared policies and intentions, suggesting that escalation management, already a very uncertain endeavor, could be especially difficult in any conflict,” it says.¶ Although conflict “mercifully” seems unlikely at this point, the report concludes that “it cannot be ruled out and may become increasingly likely if we are unwise or unlucky.”¶ The report says: “With both sides possessing and looking set to retain formidable nuclear weapons arsenals, such a conflict would be tremendously dangerous and quite possibly devastating.”

#### That collapses the biggest internal link to relations – absent the plan Sino-Taiwan war is inevitable

Mazza 1/3 Michael, research fellow in foreign and defense policy at the American Enterprise Institute, 1/3/13, “Four Surprises That Could Rock Asia in 2013,” http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/01/03/four\_surprises\_that\_could\_rock\_asia\_in\_2012?page=full

Since President Ma Ying-jeou came to power in 2008, Taipei and Beijing have improved ties and deepened their economic integration: cross-strait trade reached $127.6 billion in 2011, an increase of more than 13 percent from 2010. Some national security experts misinterpret this trend, thinking that growing economic interdependence will overwhelm factors pushing the two sides apart, and that interdependence will provide Beijing with leverage it can use to compel unification. But while Taiwan's businesspeople enjoy closer ties with China, the average Taiwanese voter continues to move toward independence. Over the last 20 years, the portion of citizens of Taiwan identifying as "Taiwanese" has increased from 17.6 percent of those polled in 1992 to a whopping 53.7 percent today; those identifying as "Chinese" has declined over the same period from 25.5 percent to just 3.1 percent today. Support for independence has nearly doubled over the last two decades, from 11.1 percent to 19.6 percent. Support for immediate or eventual unification, meanwhile, has more than halved, from 20 percent in 1992 to 9.8 percent in 2012.¶ Economic integration is apparently failing to halt what Beijing sees as a troubling trend. With a cross-strait trade agreement and a slew of other, easier deals already on the books, Beijing now expects Ma to discuss political issues. But Ma doesn't have the domestic political support to pursue political talks -- in March 2012, two months after his reelection, 45 percent of those polled said the pace of cross-strait exchanges was "just right," but the share of respondents answering "too fast" had increased to 32.6 percent, from 25.7 percent before the election. Any Chinese shift toward a more strident Taiwan policy could portend a new crisis in the Taiwan Strait sooner than many expect, as a lack of progress on these issues may buttress hawks in the new Xi Jinping administration. And America would surely be dragged in: Even low-level coercive measures against Taiwan -- a top 10 U.S. trading partner and security ally -- could throw U.S.-China relations into a tailspin.

#### Multilateral hegemony solves great power wars – the alternative is apolarity

Kempe 2012, Frederick Kempe, president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council, a foreign policy think tank and public policy group, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Atlantic Council since December 1, 2006, and is a Visiting Fellow at Oxford University's Saïd Business School, April 18, 2012, “Does America still want to lead the world?”, <http://blogs.reuters.com/thinking-global/2012/04/18/does-america-still-want-to-lead-the-world/>,)

For all their bitter differences, President Obama and Governor Romney share one overwhelming challenge. Whoever is elected will face the growing reality that the greatest risk to global stability over the next 20 years may be the nature of America itself. Nothing – not Iranian or North Korean nuclear weapons, not violent extremists or Mideast instability, not climate change or economic imbalances – will shape the world as profoundly as the ability of the United States to remain an effective and confident world player advocating its traditional global purpose of individual rights and open societies. That was the conclusion of the Global Agenda Council on the United States, a group of experts that was brought together by the World Economic Forum and that I have chaired. Even more intriguing, our group tested our views on, among others, a set of Chinese officials and experts, who worried that we would face a world overwhelmed by chaos if the U.S. – facing resource restraints, leadership fatigue and domestic political dysfunction – disengaged from its global responsibilities. U.S. leadership, with all its shortcomings and missteps, has been the glue and underwriter of global stability since World War Two – more than any other nation. Even with the world experiencing its greatest shift of economic and political power since the 19th century, no other country is emerging – or looks likely to emerge – that would be as prepared or equipped to exercise leadership on behalf of the global good. Yet many in the world are questioning the role of U.S. leadership, the governance architecture it helped create and even the values for which the U.S. stands. Weary from a decade of war and strained financially, Americans themselves are rethinking whether they can afford global purpose. The election campaign is unlikely to shed much light on these issues, yet both candidates face an inescapable truth: How the U.S. evolves over the next 15 to 20 years will be most important single variable (and the greatest uncertainty) hovering over the global future. And the two most important elements that will shape the U.S. course, in the view of the Global Agenda Council on the United States, will be American intentions and the capability to act on them. In short, will Americans continue to see as part of their identity the championing of values such as individual opportunity and open societies that have contributed so richly to the global commons? Second, can the U.S. sufficiently address its domestic challenges to assure its economic, political and societal strength while the world changes at unprecedented velocity? Consider this: It took Great Britain 155 years to double its gross domestic product per capita in the 18th and 19th centuries, when it was the world’s leading power. It took the U.S. 50 years to do the same by 1950, when its population was 152 million. Both India and China have achieved the same growth on a scale and at a pace never experienced before. Both countries have more than a hundred times the population of Britain during its heyday, yet they are achieving similar outcomes in a tenth of the time. Although China will likely surpass the U.S. as the world’s largest economy by 2030, Americans retain distinct advantages that could allow them to remain the pivotal power. Think of Uncle Sam as a poker player sitting at a global table of cohorts, holding better cards than anyone else: a free and vibrant society, a history of technological innovation, an ability to attract capital and generate jobs, and a relatively young and regenerating population. However, it doesn’t matter how good your cards are if you’re playing them poorly. Put another way, the candidate who wins in November is going to be faced with the reality summed up by the cartoon character Pogo in 1971 as he was trying to make his way through a prickly primeval forest without proper footwear: “We have met the enemy and he is us.” Imagine two very different scenarios for the world, based on how America rises to its challenges. The positive scenario would require whoever is elected in November to be a unifier, someone who can rise above our current squabbles and galvanize not only the U.S. but also the world around a greater understanding of this historic moment. He would address the larger U.S. issues of failing infrastructure, falling educational standards, widening deficits and spiraling healthcare costs. He would partner more effectively with rising powers, and China in particular. And he would recognize and act upon the strategic stake the U.S. has in a politically confident, economically healthy Europe. The doubling of the global middle class by a billion people by 2030 plays into U.S. political and economic strengths, increasing demand for the products and services of information technology where the U.S. excels. Developments that improve the extraction of shale natural gas and oil provide the U.S. and some of its allies disproportionate benefits. Under this positive scenario, the U.S. could log growth rates of 2.7 percent or more each year, compared with 2.5 percent over the past 20 years. Average living standards could rise by 40 percent through 2030, keeping alive the American dream and restoring the global attractiveness of the U.S. model. The negative scenario results from a U.S. that fails to rise to its current challenges. Great powers decline when they fail to address the problems they recognize. U.S. growth could slow to an average of 1.5 percent per year, if that. The knock-on impact on the world economy could be a half-percent per year. The shift in the perception of the U.S. as a descending power would be more pronounced. This sort of United States would be increasingly incapable of leading and disinclined to try. It is an America that would be more likely to be protectionist and less likely to retool global institutions to make them more effective. One can already see hints of what such a world would look like. Middle Eastern diplomats in Washington say the failure of the U.S. to orchestrate a more coherent and generous transatlantic and international response to their region’s upheavals has resulted in a free-for-all for influence that is favoring some of the least enlightened players. Although the U.S. has responded to the euro zone crisis, as a result of its own economic fears, it hasn’t offered a larger vision for the transatlantic future that recognizes its enormous strategic stake in Europe’s future, given global shifts of influence. The U.S. played a dominant role in reconstructing the post-World War Two international order. The question is whether it will do so again or instead contribute to a dangerous global power vacuum that no one over the next two decades is willing or capable of filling.

#### AND – American involvement is inevitable – decline causes lash out and great power wars

Brzezinski 12 Zbigniew, national security advisor under U.S. President Jimmy Carter, PHD, JAN/FEB, “After America”, <http://www.foreignpolicy.com.ezproxy.baylor.edu/articles/2012/01/03/after_america?print=yes&hidecomments=yes&page=full>,)

Not so long ago, a high-ranking Chinese official, who obviously had concluded that America's decline and China's rise were both inevitable, noted in a burst of candor to a senior U.S. official: "But, please, let America not decline too quickly." Although the inevitability of the Chinese leader's expectation is still far from certain, he was right to be cautious when looking forward to America's demise. For if America falters, the world is unlikely to be dominated by a single preeminent successor -- not even China. International uncertainty, increased tension among global competitors, and even outright chaos would be far more likely outcomes. While a sudden, massive crisis of the American system -- for instance, another financial crisis -- would produce a fast-moving chain reaction leading to global political and economic disorder, a steady drift by America into increasingly pervasive decay or endlessly widening warfare with Islam would be unlikely to produce, even by 2025, an effective global successor. No single power will be ready by then to exercise the role that the world, upon the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, expected the United States to play: the leader of a new, globally cooperative world order. More probable would be a protracted phase of rather inconclusive realignments of both global and regional power, with no grand winners and many more losers, in a setting of international uncertainty and even of potentially fatal risks to global well-being. Rather than a world where dreams of democracy flourish, a Hobbesian world of enhanced national security based on varying fusions of authoritarianism, nationalism, and religion could ensue. The leaders of the world's second-rank powers, among them India, Japan, Russia, and some European countries, are already assessing the potential impact of U.S. decline on their respective national interests. The Japanese, fearful of an assertive China dominating the Asian mainland, may be thinking of closer links with Europe. Leaders in India and Japan may be considering closer political and even military cooperation in case America falters and China rises. Russia, while perhaps engaging in wishful thinking (even schadenfreude) about America's uncertain prospects, will almost certainly have its eye on the independent states of the former Soviet Union. Europe, not yet cohesive, would likely be pulled in several directions: Germany and Italy toward Russia because of commercial interests, France and insecure Central Europe in favor of a politically tighter European Union, and Britain toward manipulating a balance within the EU while preserving its special relationship with a declining United States. Others may move more rapidly to carve out their own regional spheres: Turkey in the area of the old Ottoman Empire, Brazil in the Southern Hemisphere, and so forth. None of these countries, however, will have the requisite combination of economic, financial, technological, and military power even to consider inheriting America's leading role. China, invariably mentioned as America's prospective successor, has an impressive imperial lineage and a strategic tradition of carefully calibrated patience, both of which have been critical to its overwhelmingly successful, several-thousand-year-long history. China thus prudently accepts the existing international system, even if it does not view the prevailing hierarchy as permanent. It recognizes that success depends not on the system's dramatic collapse but on its evolution toward a gradual redistribution of power. Moreover, the basic reality is that China is not yet ready to assume in full America's role in the world. Beijing's leaders themselves have repeatedly emphasized that on every important measure of development, wealth, and power, China will still be a modernizing and developing state several decades from now, significantly behind not only the United States but also Europe and Japan in the major per capita indices of modernity and national power. Accordingly, Chinese leaders have been restrained in laying any overt claims to global leadership. At some stage, however, a more assertive Chinese nationalism could arise and damage China's international interests. A swaggering, nationalistic Beijing would unintentionally mobilize a powerful regional coalition against itself. None of China's key neighbors -- India, Japan, and Russia -- is ready to acknowledge China's entitlement to America's place on the global totem pole. They might even seek support from a waning America to offset an overly assertive China. The resulting regional scramble could become intense, especially given the similar nationalistic tendencies among China's neighbors. A phase of acute international tension in Asia could ensue. Asia of the 21st century could then begin to resemble Europe of the 20th century -- violent and bloodthirsty. At the same time, the security of a number of weaker states located geographically next to major regional powers also depends on the international status quo reinforced by America's global preeminence -- and would be made significantly more vulnerable in proportion to America's decline. The states in that exposed position -- including Georgia, Taiwan, South Korea, Belarus, Ukraine, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Israel, and the greater Middle East -- are today's geopolitical equivalents of nature's most endangered species. Their fates are closely tied to the nature of the international environment left behind by a waning America, be it ordered and restrained or, much more likely, self-serving and expansionist. A faltering United States could also find its strategic partnership with Mexico in jeopardy. America's economic resilience and political stability have so far mitigated many of the challenges posed by such sensitive neighborhood issues as economic dependence, immigration, and the narcotics trade. A decline in American power, however, would likely undermine the health and good judgment of the U.S. economic and political systems. A waning United States would likely be more nationalistic, more defensive about its national identity, more paranoid about its homeland security, and less willing to sacrifice resources for the sake of others' development. The worsening of relations between a declining America and an internally troubled Mexico could even give rise to a particularly ominous phenomenon: the emergence, as a major issue in nationalistically aroused Mexican politics, of territorial claims justified by history and ignited by cross-border incidents. Another consequence of American decline could be a corrosion of the generally cooperative management of the global commons -- shared interests such as sea lanes, space, cyberspace, and the environment, whose protection is imperative to the long-term growth of the global economy and the continuation of basic geopolitical stability. In almost every case, the potential absence of a constructive and influential U.S. role would fatally undermine the essential communality of the global commons because the superiority and ubiquity of American power creates order where there would normally be conflict.

#### Heg prevents Indo-Pak War – goes nuclear

Brzezinski ‘04 [Zbigniew, (Former Sect. Of State) The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership, Perseus, New York]

For the time being. the key US. interest is to prevent a nuclear war from erupting between Pakistan and India and to discourage any further regional proliferation, especially since there can he little doubt that the once-imperial and nationally ambitious Iran looks with under­standable envy at its nuclear-armed neighbors. Of the two goals, the prevention of a nuclear war may be somewhat easier to pursue because the very possession of nuclear weaponry is forcing both the Indian and the Pakistani militaries to calculate more cautiously the potential con­sequences of their periodic border clashes. Nonetheless, the unresolved issue of Kashmir is bound to pro­duce repeated collisions, each of which inflames the volatile and reli­giously conflicted Muslim and Hindu masses. Pakistan could then even become a fundamentalist Muslim state (thus probably determin­ing Afghanistan’s fate as well), while India might be seized by fanatical Hindu passions. Irrationality might then overwhelm the strategic restraint inherent in the nuclear calculus. Just as the West for years has been relatively indifferent to the unresolved Palestinian issue, so it has also neglected Kashmir. India has been able to insist formally that there is no Kashmir issue, either between India and Pakistan or for the international community as a whole—that it is an internal matter. Pakistan in turn has relied on thinly camouflaged official support for guerrilla and terrorist actions against India’s control of the province as a way of keeping the issue alive—thereby also precipitating increasingly heavy-handed Indian repression of Kashmiris suspected of disloyalty. Once both countries acquired nuclear weapons, the Kashmir issue inevitably gained wider international significance. The question of Kashmir has now become part of the larger problem of instability in the Global Balkans. Its peaceful resolution is likely to he at least as difficult as that of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The conflict involves two major states that jointly have a population approaching 1.2 billion people—roughly one-fifth of the world—and much of that population is still pre-modern, semiliterate, and suscep­tible (even among the elites) to demagogic appeals. Fostering a compromise in that setting will require sustained outside engagement, considerable international pressure, major political and financial inducements, and a great deal of patience. Here again, political solidarity between the United States and the European Union, perhaps tangibly backed by Japan, would make even­tual success more likely. Great Britain, for historical reasons, can play an important diplomatic role, especially in concert with the United States. Both Russia and China may be supportive, since neither would benefit from a nuclear war in its immediate proximity, and each can subtly influence the major purchaser of its arms exports (India in the case of Russia, Pakistan in the case of China). The reality, however, is that a major collective international effort is likely only in the face of an imminent threat of war, with international concern rapidly fading once the threat recedes [P. 76-77]

#### ALSO key to European stability

Kagan ‘7 – Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Senior Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund (Robert, “End of Dreams, Return of History,” Hoover Institution, No. 144, August/September, [http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/6136](http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/6136%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank))

Such order as exists in the world rests not merely on the goodwill of peoples but on a foundation provided by American power. Even the European Union, that great geopolitical miracle, owes its founding to American power, for without it the European nations after World War ii would never have felt secure enough to reintegrate Germany. Most Europeans recoil at the thought, but even today Europe ’s stability depends on the guarantee, however distant and one hopes unnecessary, that the United States could step in to check any dangerous development on the continent. In a genuinely multipolar world, that would not be possible without renewing the danger of world war.

#### Goes nuclear

Glaser ’93 (Charles L Glaser (Professor of Public Policy at University of Chicago) 1993 International Security, Summer, p. 8-9)

However, although the lack of an imminent Soviet threat eliminates the most obvious danger, U.S. security has not been entirely separated from the future of Western Europe. The ending of the Cold War has brought many benefits, but has not eliminated the possibility of major power war, especially since such a war could grow out of a smaller conflict in the East. And, although nuclear weapons have greatly reduced the threat that a European hegemon would pose to U.S. security, a sound case nevertheless remains that a European war could threaten U.S. security. The United States couldbe drawn into such a war, even if strict security considerations suggested it should stay out. A major power war could escalate to a nuclear war that, especially if the United States joins, could include attacks against the American homeland. Thus, the United States should not be unconcerned about Europe’s future.

## 2AC – Round 1

**Biodiversity is key to value to life – without out it we lose our well being**

**GreenFacts 08**, (GreenFacts Foundation international [non-profit](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Non-profit) organization that produces short scientific summaries. <http://www.greenfacts.org/en/biodiversity/l-2/2-biodiversity-synthesis-report.htm#1> )

<http://www.greenfacts.org/en/biodiversity/l-2/2-biodiversity-synthesis-report.htm#1>

Freedom of choice and action within the MA context refers to individuals having control over what happens and being able to achieve what they value (CF3 ). Loss of biodiversity often means a loss of choices. Local fishers depend on man groves as breeding grounds for local fish populations. Loss of mangroves translates to a loss in control over the local fish stock and a livelihood they have been pursuing for many generations and that they value. Another example is high-diversity agricultural systems. These systems normally produce less cash than monoculture cash crops, but farmers have some control over their entitlements because of spreading risk through diversity. High diversity of genotypes, populations, species, functional types, and spatial patches decreases the negative effects of pests and pathogens on crops and keeps open possibilities for agrarian communities to develop crops suited to future environmental challenges and to increase their resilience to climate variability and market fluctuations (C11 ). Another dimension of choices relates to the future. The loss of biodiversity in some instances is irreversible, and the value individuals place on keeping biodiversity for future generations—the option value—can be significant (CF6 , C2 ). The notion of having choices available irrespective of whether any of them will be actually picked is an essential constituent of the freedom aspect of well-being. However, putting a monetary figure on option values is notoriously difficult. We can only postulate on the needs and desires of future generations, some of which can be very different from today’s aspirations.

#### The Judge is a policymaker tasked with evaluating cost benefit policy analysis - prevents unpredictable frameworks that divert topic focus and moot 1AC time

#### Preventing extinction is the first ethical priority—this evidence is comparative to their impacts

Ochs 2 (Richard DC Black Panther, president of the Aberdeen Proving Ground Superfund Citizens Coalition, member of the Depleted Uranium Task force of the Military Toxics Project and a member of the Chemical Weapons Working Group. After completing a course in Atomic and Nuclear Physics at Muhlenberg College, he transferred to the University of Maryland, where he had a split major in history and political science. He was a founding member of the Students for a Democratic Society at College Park, June 9th, “BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS MUST BE ABOLISHED IMMEDIATELY”, <http://www.freefromterror.net/other_articles/abolish.html>,)

Potentially worse than that, bio-engineered agents by the hundreds with no known cure could wreck even greater calamity on the human race than could persistent radiation. AIDS and ebola viruses are just a small example of recently emerging plagues with no known cure or vaccine. Can we imagine hundreds of such plagues? HUMAN EXTINCTION IS NOW POSSIBLE. Ironically, the Bush administration has just changed the U.S. nuclear doctrine to allow nuclear retaliation against threats upon allies by conventional weapons. The past doctrine allowed such use only as a last resort when our nation’s survival was at stake. Will the new policy also allow easier use of US bioweapons? How slippery is this slope? Against this tendency can be posed a rational alternative policy. To preclude possibilities of human extinction, "patriotism" needs to be redefined to make humanity’s survival primary and absolute. Even if we lose our cherished freedom, our sovereignty, our government or our Constitution, where there is life, there is hope. What good is anything else if humanity is extinguished? This concept should be promoted to the center of national debate.. For example, for sake of argument, suppose the ancient Israelites developed defensive bioweapons of mass destruction when they were enslaved by Egypt. Then suppose these weapons were released by design or accident and wiped everybody out? As bad as slavery is, extinction is worse. Our generation, our century, our epoch needs to take the long view. We truly hold in our hands the precious gift of all future life. Empires may come and go, but who are the honored custodians of life on earth? Temporal politicians? Corporate competitors? Strategic brinksmen? Military gamers? Inflated egos dripping with testosterone? How can any sane person believe that national sovereignty is more important than survival of the species? Now that extinction is possible, our slogan should be "Where there is life, there is hope." No government, no economic system, no national pride, no religion, no political system can be placed above human survival. The egos of leaders must not blind us. The adrenaline and vengeance of a fight must not blind us. The game is over. If patriotism would extinguish humanity, then patriotism is the highest of all crimes.

#### Perm do both – alt cedes politics

Walt 11 (Stephen M, Professor at the University of Chicago, October 19, “Lessons for the social sciences” , [http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/10/19/lessons\_for\_the\_social\_sciences](http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/10/19/lessons_for_the_social_sciences%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank))

Needless to say, I like this argument because I believe it is important for the social sciences to be a diverse intellectual ecosystem instead of a monoculture where one approach or method reigns supreme. Even if one approach or theoretical model were demonstrably superior -- and that is rarely, if ever, the case -- there would still be considerable value in having lots of other scholars working in different ways. Sometimes we learn by exploring deductions in a formal model (though we often just restate the obvious when we do); at other times we learn by "soaking and poking" among policymakers, by constructing a data set and exploring patterns within it, or by immersing ourselves in the details of historical cases or by exploring the categories of thought and discourse that surround a given policy domain. Given that all these approaches yield useful knowledge, why would any serious department want to privilege one approach over all others? But because academic disciplines are largely self-defining and self-policing (i.e., we determine the "criteria of merit" and success depends almost entirely on one's reputation among fellow academics), there is the ever-present danger that academic disciplines spin off into solipsistic and self-regarding theorizing that is divorced from the real world (and therefore unlikely to be refuted by events) and of little value to our students, to policymakers, or even interested citizens. This tendency occurs primarily because proponents of one approach naturally tend to think that their way of doing business is superior, and some of them work overtime to promote people who look like them and to exclude people whose work is different. Anybody who has spent a few years in a contemporary political science department cannot fail to have observed this phenomenon at work; there just aren't very many people who are genuinely catholic in their tastes and willing to embrace work that isn't pretty much like their own. This situation creates a real dilemma: if you believe in academic freedom (and I do), then you don't want outside authorities interfering in the production of knowledge, telling academics how to do their work, or setting stupid criteria for evaluating scholarly contributions. But without some pressure to be at least potentially relevant, the social sciences are prone to drift off into what Hans Morgenthau once decried as "the trivial, the formal, the methodological, the purely theoretical, the remotely historical -- in short, the politically irrelevant." I've already touted my own prescriptions for this problem here, but I don't have enormous confidence that any of them will be heeded. But at the risk of seeming to tout my own employer (and similar programs elsewhere), that's why I increasingly expect the most interesting and relevant work to emerge from schools of public policy, and not from the increasingly arcane worlds of traditional disciplinary departments.

#### No impact to biopower

Dickinson 4 (Edward Ross, University of Cincinnati, “Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse About ‘Modernity’”, Central European History, 37, p. 18-19)

In an important programmatic statement of 1996 Geoff Eley celebrated the fact that Foucault’s ideas have “fundamentally directed attention away from institutionally centered conceptions of government and the state . . . and toward a dispersed and decentered notion of power and its ‘microphysics.’”48 The “broader, deeper, and less visible ideological consensus” on “technocratic reason and the ethical unboundedness of science” was the focus of his interest.49 But the “power-producing effects in Foucault’s ‘microphysical’ sense” (Eley) of the construction of social bureaucracies and social knowledge, of “an entire institutional apparatus and system of practice” ( Jean Quataert), simply do not explain Nazi policy.50 The destructive dynamic of Nazism was a product not so much of a particular modern set of ideas as of a particular modern political structure, one that could realize the disastrous potential of those ideas. What was critical was not the expansion of the instruments and disciplines of biopolitics, which occurred everywhere in Europe. Instead, it was the principles that guided how those instruments and disciplines were organized and used, and the external constraints on them. In National Socialism, biopolitics was shaped by a totalitarian conception of social management focused on the power and ubiquity of the völkisch state. In democratic societies, biopolitics has historically been constrained by a rights-based strategy of social management. This is a point to which I will return shortly. For now, the point is that what was decisive was actually politics at the level of the state. A comparative framework can help us to clarify this point. Other states passed compulsory sterilization laws in the 1930s — indeed, individual states in the United States had already begun doing so in 1907. Yet they did not proceed to the next steps adopted by National Socialism — mass sterilization, mass “eugenic” abortion and murder of the “defective.” Individual figures in, for example, the U.S. did make such suggestions. But neither the political structures of democratic states nor their legal and political principles permitted such policies actually being enacted. Nor did the scale of forcible sterilization in other countries match that of the Nazi program. I do not mean to suggest that such programs were not horrible; but in a democratic political context they did not develop the dynamic of constant radicalization and escalation that characterized Nazi policies.

### Reparations politics proves that focus on the state is a productive and emancipatory individual performance, especially when connected with human rights

Balfour 5 (Reparations after Identity Politics Author(s): Lawrie Balfour University of Virginia Reviewed work(s): Source: Political Theory, Vol. 33, No. 6 (Dec., 2005), pp. 786-811)

First, the demand for reparations provides a reminder that the dismissal of the use of state power as an instrument for meaningful social change mis- reads history. In this light, Martin Luther King, Jr.'s comment that "it was a great relief to be in a federal court"'54 does not signal a belief in the benignity or ultimate fairness of the federal judiciary so much as a sense of the impossi- bility of local justice in the Jim Crow South. The state is figured as protector only in a relative sense, and what is sought is not recognition of a wounded self-image. Instead, the turn to the courts represents an instance of the demo- cratic practice of insisting that the government be responsive to all of the peo- ple. Thus where Brown laments the "boundless litigiousness of the present age, .... the conversion of historical-political claims of oppression to legal claims for rights or reparations,"55 Charles Ogletree, the cochair of the Repa- rations Coordinating Committee, makes a case for litigation as a tool for the expression of "historical-political claims of oppression." Reparations law- suits, according to Ogletree, are not understood as an alternative to struggle so much as an instrument of struggle, and recognizing the disciplinary power of law does not entail the refusal to engage it as an always limited and prob- lematic ally in emancipatory political projects.56 Shifting attention away from legal outcomes to the importance of public claim-making in reparations politics, Yamamoto suggests that it is useful to treat "law and court pro- cess . .. as generators of 'cultural performances' and as vehicles for providing outsiders an institutional public forum.""'57 Further, by explicitly linking its claims to an international system of white supremacy and global struggles for human rights, the reparations move- ment offers an example of oppositional politics not content "to rely upon the U.S. nation-state as a stable container of social antagonisms, and as the nec- essary horizon of our hopes for justice."59 And even as reparations advocates turn to the U.S. government, their actions explicitly uncover the implication of state power in the institution of slavery and the forms of racial injustice that succeeded it. They call attention to the ways citizenship and anticitizenship have been defined and uncover the multiple dimensions in which those cate- gories persist.60 For example, the "Freedom Agenda" of the Black Radical Congress indicates how an explicitly "Black" politics can be oppositional not only in its attack on white supremacy but also in its simultaneous refutation of patriarchal power and the exclusion of marginalized subcommunities.61 While it is possible that reparations programs could reinforce class lines and structures of authority within black communities, furthermore, such an out- come is not inevitable. In lieu of a single fund of monies managed by elites and dispersed to individual claimants, many supporters of reparations advo- cate the development of multiple channels of funding. To that end, Manning Marable suggests that economic reparations should make resources available to a range of community-based organizations and give priority to those groups operating in black communities with high rates of unemployment.62 Reparations activist "Queen Mother" Audley Moore makes a related case, arguing for a democratic decision-making structure that would give authority over any compensation to ordinary citizens.63

#### Value to life is inevitable—the only thing that ends value to life is death

Schwartz 2 (Chair at the Centre for Health Economics and Policy Analysis,

“Medical Ethic: A Case Based Approach” Chapter 6, www.fleshandbones.com/readingroom/pdf/399.pdf)

The second assertion made by supporters of the quality of life as a criterion for decisionmaking is closely related to the first, but with an added dimension. This assertion suggests that the determination of the value of the quality of a given life is a subjective determination to be made by the person experiencing that life. The important addition here is that the decision is a personal one that, ideally, ought not to be made externally by another person but internally by the individual involved. Katherine Lewis made this decision for herself based on a comparison between two stages of her life. So did James Brady. Without this element, decisions based on quality of life criteria lack salient information and the patients concerned cannot give informed consent. Patients must be given the opportunity to decide for themselves whether they think their lives are worth living or not. To ignore or overlook patients’ judgement in this matter is to violate their autonomy and their freedom to decide for themselves on the basis of relevant information about their future, and comparative consideration of their past. As the deontological position puts it so well, to do so is to violate the imperative that we must treat persons as rational and as ends in themselves.

In practice their alternative will further tyrannical control and genocide

Richard Barbrook, coordinator of the Hypermedia Research Centre at the University of Westminster, 8/27/1998, http://amsterdam.nettime.org/Lists-Archives/nettime-l-9808/msg00091.html, accessed 3/3/03

Deleuze and Guattari enthusiastically joined this attack against the concept of historical progress. For them, the 'deterritorialisation' of urban society was the solution to the contradiction between participatory democracy and revolutionary elitism haunting the New Left. If the centralised city could be broken down into 'molecular rhizomes', direct democracy and the gift economy would reappear as people formed themselves into small nomadic bands. According to Deleuze and Guattari, anarcho-communism was not the 'end of history': the material result of a long epoch of social development. On the contrary, the liberation of desire from semiotic oppression was a perpetual promise: an ethical stance which could be equally lived by nomads in ancient times or social movements in the present. With enough intensity of effort, anyone could overcome their hierarchical brainwashing to become a fully-liberated individual: the holy fool.<21> Yet, as the experience of Frequence Libre proved, this rhetoric of unlimited freedom contained a deep desire for ideological control by the New Left vanguard. While the nomadic fantasies of A Thousand Plateaus were being composed, one revolutionary movement actually did carry out Deleuze and Guattari's dream of destroying the city. Led by a vanguard of Paris-educated intellectuals, the Khmer Rouge overthrew an oppressive regime installed by the Americans. Rejecting the 'grand narrative' of economic progress, Pol Pot and his organisation instead tried to construct a rural utopia. However, when the economy subsequently imploded, the regime embarked on ever more ferocious purges until the country was rescued by an invasion by neighbouring Vietnam. Deleuze and Guattari had claimed that the destruction of the city would create direct democracy and libidinal ecstasy. Instead, the application of such anti-modernism in practice resulted in tyranny and genocide. The 'line of flight' from Stalin had led to Pol Pot.

#### Representations of the state are key to prevent impacts

Martin 2 (Brian Professor of Social Sciences in the [School of Social Sciences, Media and Communication](http://www.uow.edu.au/arts/ssmac/index.html) at the University of Wollongong, September 3, “Activism After Nuclear War?,” http://www.uow.edu.au/arts/sts/bmartin/pubs/02tff.html.)

If worst comes to worst and nuclear weapons cause physical effects close to home, then survival becomes a priority. It makes sense to know the basics about the effects of nuclear war - blast, heat, radiation - and how to protect. Knowing basic first aid is important too. There is plenty of information on what to do in the event of nuclear war, but most social activists have avoided even thinking about it on the grounds that preparation makes nuclear war more likely. I disagree. If activists are seen to be ready, this makes nuclear war less likely. Nuclear weapons are severely stigmatised largely due to the efforts of peace activists. Governments have been reluctant to use nuclear weapons because they realise there will be an enormous political backlash. From the 1940s on, US leaders have considered using nuclear weapons on quite a number of occasions - such as during the Vietnam war - but always refrained, largely due to the fear of a backlash. If, despite this, nuclear weapons are used, it is vital that social activists capitalise on the widespread revulsion that will occur. To do this, activists need to be prepared. Otherwise, the next nuclear war will be only the beginning of a series of nuclear wars. A further implication is that activists need to be psychologically prepared for nuclear war. For decades, many people have thought of nuclear war as "the end": as extinction or the end of civilisation. But limited nuclear war has always been possible and even a major nuclear war could leave billions of people alive. Therefore it makes sense to think through the implications and make suitable preparations. Nuclear war is almost bound to be a disaster, not only in human and environmental terms but as well in terms of political prospects for achieving a better world. Activists are doing what they can to prevent nuclear war, but they are not the ones who design and produce the weapons and prepare to use them. Given that nuclear weapons may be used despite the best efforts of peace activists, it makes sense to be prepared for the aftermath. That means preparing organisationally and psychologically.

#### Quality of life is skyrocketing worldwide by all measures

Ridley 10 (visiting professor at Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory, former science editor of *The Economist*, and award-winning science writer, Matt, *The Rational Optimist*, pg. 13-15)

If my fictional family is not to your taste, perhaps you prefer statistics. Since 1800, the population of the world has multiplied six times, yet **average life expectancy has more than doubled and real income has risen more than nine times**. Taking a shorter perspective, in 2005, compared with 1955, the average human being on Planet Earth earned nearly three times as much money (corrected for inflation), ate one-third more calories of food, buried one-third as many of her children and could expect to live one-third longer. She was less likely to die as a result of war, murder, childbirth, accidents, tornadoes, flooding, famine, whooping cough, tuberculosis, malaria, diphtheria, typhus, typhoid, measles, smallpox, scurvy or polio. She was less likely, at any given age, to get cancer, heart disease or stroke. She was more likely to be literate and to have finished school. She was more likely to own a telephone, a flush toilet, a refrigerator and a bicycle. All this during a half-century when the world population has more than doubled, so that far from being rationed by population pressure, the goods and services available to the people of the world have expanded. It is, by any standard, an astonishing human achievement. Averages conceal a lot. **But even if you break down the world into bits**, **it is hard to find any region that was worse off in 2005 than it was in 1955**. Over that half-century, real income per head ended a little lower in only six countries (Afghanistan, Haiti, Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Somalia), life expectancy in three (Russia, Swaziland and Zimbabwe), and infant survival in none. In the rest they have rocketed upward. Africa’s rate of improvement has been distressingly slow and patchy compared with the rest of the world, and many southern African countries saw life expectancy plunge in the 1990s as the AIDS epidemic took hold (before recovering in recent years). There were also moments in the half-century when you could have caught countries in episodes of dreadful deterioration of living standards or life chances – China in the 1960s, Cambodia in the 1970s, Ethiopia in the 1980s, Rwanda in the 1990s, Congo in the 2000s, North Korea throughout. Argentina had a disappointingly stagnant twentieth century. But overall, after fifty years, **the outcome for the world is** remarkably, astonishingly, **dramatically positive**. The average South Korean lives twenty-six more years and earns fifteen times as much income each year as he did in 1955 (and earns fifteen times as much as his North Korean counter part). The average Mexican lives longer now than the average Briton did in 1955. The average Botswanan earns more than the average Finn did in 1955. **Infant mortality is lower today in Nepal than it was in Italy in 1951**. The proportion of Vietnamese living on less than $2 a day has dropped from 90 per cent to 30 per cent in twenty years. The rich have got richer, but the poor have done even better. **The poor in the developing world grew their consumption twice as fast as the world as a whole between 1980 and 2000**. The Chinese are ten times as rich, one-third as fecund and twenty-eight years longer-lived than they were fifty years ago. Even Nigerians are twice as rich, 25 per cent less fecund and nine years longer-lived than they were in 1955. **Despite a doubling of the world population**, even **the raw number of people living in absolute poverty** (defined as less than a 1985 dollar a day) **has fallen since the 1950s**. The percentage living in such absolute poverty has dropped by more than half – to less than 18 per cent. That number is, of course, still all too horribly high, but the trend is hardly a cause for despair: at the current rate of decline, it would hit zero around 2035 – though it probably won’t. The United Nations estimates that poverty was reduced more in the last fifty years than in the previous 500.

### The alternatives specificity links it back to itself – multiple lines of flight solves best

Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Frenchie Philosophizers, A THOUSAND PLATEAUS, p. 227-228, 1987,

The second danger, Clarity, seems less obvious. Clarity, in effect, con- cerns the molecular. Once again, everything is involved, even perception, even the semiotic regime, but this time on the second line. Castaneda illus-trates, for example, the existence of a molecular perception to which drugs give us access (but so many things can be drugs): we attain a visual and sonorous microperception revealing spaces and voids, like holes in the molar structure. That is precisely what clarity is: the distinctions that appear in what used to seem full, the holes in what used to be compact; and conversely, where just before we saw end points of clear-cut segments, now there are indistinct fringes, encroachments, overlappings, migrations, acts of segmentation that no longer coincide with the rigid segmentarity. Every-thing now appears supple, with holes in fullness, nebulas in forms, and flut-ter in lines. Everything has the clarity of the microscope. We think we have understood everything, and draw conclusions. We are the new knights; we even have a mission. A microphysics of the migrant has replaced the macrogeometry of the sedentary. But this suppleness and clarity do not only present dangers, they are themselves a danger. First, supple segmen-tarity runs the risk of reproducing in miniature the affections, the affecta-tions, of the rigid: the family is replaced by a community, conjugality by a regime of exchange and migration; worse, micro-Oedipuses crop up, microfascisms lay down the law, the mother feels obliged to titillate her child, the father becomes a mommy. A dark light that falls from no star and emanates such sadness: this shifting segmentarity derives directly from the most rigid, for which it is indirect compensation. The more molar the aggregates become, the more molecular become their elements and the relations between their elements: molecular man for molar humanity. One deterritorializes, massifies, but only in order to knot and annul the mass movements and movements of deterritorialization, to invent all kinds of marginal reterritorializations even worse than the others. But above all, supple segmentarity brings dangers of its own that do not merely reproduce in small scale the dangers of molar segmentarity, which do not derive fromthem or compensate for them. As we have seen, microfascisms have a spe-cificity of their own that can crystallize into a macro fascism, but may also float along the supple line on their own account and suffuse every little cell. A multitude of black holes may very well not become centralized, and acts instead as viruses adapting to the most varied situations, sinking voids in molecular perceptions and semiotics. Interactions without resonance. Instead of the great paranoid fear, we are trapped in a thousand little mono-manias, self-evident truths, and clarities that gush from every black hole and no longer form a system, but are only rumble and buzz, blinding lights giving any and everybody the mission of self-appointed judge, dispenser of justice, policeman, neighborhood SS man. We have overcome fear, we have sailed from the shores of security, only to enter a system that is no less concentricized, no less organized: the system of petty insecurities that leads everyone to their own black hole in which to turn dangerous, possess-ing a clarity on their situation, role, and mission even more disturbing than the certitudes of the first line.

#### Deleuze and Guattari's belief in transformation through freedom from dialectical opposition fails – the figures and institutions which could create this freedom are reappropriated by contemporary oppositional politics, foreclosing exits from the existing political system

#### **The Cuban embargo devastates human rights in Cuba—the alternatives rejection of the affirmative dooms millions to the problems they are trying to prevent—moral obligation to vote aff to end tyranny**

Hernandez-Truyol 9 — Berta Esperanza Hernandez-Truyol, Professor of Law at the University of Florida, 2009 (“Embargo or Blockade? The Legal and Moral Dimensions of the U.S. Economic Sanctions on Cuba,” *Intercultural Human Rights Law Review* (4 Intercultural Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 53), Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Lexis-Nexis)

IV. A Critique - The Effects of the Embargo from a Social Justice Perspective n110

It is common knowledge that trade sanctions hurt workers and industries, not the officials who authored the policies that are the target of the sanctions. The countries most likely to face sanctions are those run by undemocratic governments least likely to let the pain of their population sway them. These observations hold true in the case of the U.S. embargo on Cuba.

While in nearly fifty years of the embargo the purported goal of achieving democracy in Cuba has not been met, the embargo has had deleterious effects on Cuba and the Cuban people. First, a look at some factual data in light of trade relation confirms the reality and extent of the harms suffered. In 1958, the United States accounted for 67% of Cuba's exports and 70% of its imports, n111 placing it [\*76] seventh on both export and import markets of the United States. n112 In 1999, by contrast, official U.S. exports to Cuba totaled a paltry $ 4.7 million, which was comprised mainly of donations of medical aid, pharmaceuticals, and other forms of charitable aid. n113 In the year 2000, Cuba ranked 184th of 189 importers of U.S. agricultural products. n114 The relaxation of sanctions against food and medicines beginning in 2000 found Cuba rising to 138th in 2001 and to 26th in 2004 for U.S. export markets. n115 By 2006, Cuba's ranking had fallen slightly to become the 33rd largest market for U.S. agricultural exports (exports totaling $ 328 million). n116 The U.S. International Trade Commission estimates an ongoing annual loss to all U.S. exporters of approximately $ 1.2 billion for their inability to trade with Cuba. n117

The Cuban government estimates that the total direct economic impact caused by the embargo is $ 86 billion, which includes loss of export earnings, additional costs for import, and a suppression of the growth of the Cuban economy. n118 However, various economic researchers and the U.S. State Department discount the effect of the embargo and suggest that the Cuban problem is one of lack of hard foreign currency which renders Cuba unable to purchase goods it needs in the open market. n119

 [\*77] That there has been an economic impact of the embargo is evident to anyone who visits Cuba. For example, there is a minuscule number of modern automobiles on the roads of Cuba. Most are American vehicles from the late 1950s--prior to the embargo (and the revolution). To be sure, because the law prohibits ships from entering U.S. ports for six months after making deliveries to Cuba, the policy effectively denies Cuba access to the U.S. automobile market. n120

However, the impacts of economic sanctions are greater than lack of access to goods. In the case of Cuba, some argue that the U.S. embargo has had a deleterious impact on nutrition and health with a lack of availability of medicine and equipment, as well as decreased water quality. n121 Indeed, the American Association for World Health (AAWH), in a 1997 report, concluded that

the U.S. embargo of Cuba has dramatically harmed the health and nutrition of large numbers of ordinary Cuban citizens. . . . It is our expert medical opinion that the U.S. embargo has caused a significant rise in suffering—and even deaths—in Cuba. . . . A humanitarian catastrophe has been averted only because the Cuban government has maintained a high level of budgetary support for a health care system designed to deliver primary and preventive health care to all of its citizens. n122

Thus, AAWH concludes that the embargo, limiting availability of food, medicine, and medical supplies, has a deleterious effect on [\*78] Cuban society. Significantly, religious leaders, including the late Pope John Paul II, opposed the embargo and called for its end. n123 The gravamen of the objection is the humanitarian and economic hardships that the embargo causes

**Perm solves best your authors**

Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Frenchie Philosophizers, A THOUSAND PLATEAUS, p. 227-228, 1987,

The second danger, Clarity, seems less obvious. Clarity, in effect, con- cerns the molecular. Once again, everything is involved, even perception, even the semiotic regime, but this time on the second line. Castaneda illus-trates, for example, the existence of a molecular perception to which drugs give us access (but so many things can be drugs): we attain a visual and sonorous microperception revealing spaces and voids, like holes in the molar structure. That is precisely what clarity is: the distinctions that appear in what used to seem full, the holes in what used to be compact; and conversely, where just before we saw end points of clear-cut segments, now there are indistinct fringes, encroachments, overlappings, migrations, acts of segmentation that no longer coincide with the rigid segmentarity. Every-thing now appears supple, with holes in fullness, nebulas in forms, and flut-ter in lines. Everything has the clarity of the microscope. We think we have understood everything, and draw conclusions.

#### Vague alts – causes shifting prevents attack – no education – voter – turns K

Galles 9 (Gary, Professor of Economics at Pepperdine, “Vagueness as a Political Strategy,” March 2, <http://blog.mises.org/archives/author/gary_galles/>)

 The problem with such vagueness is that any informed public policy decision has to be based on specific proposals. Absent concrete details, which is where the devil lurks, no one–including those proposing a “reform”–can judge how it would fare or falter in the real world. So when the President wants approval for a proposal which offers too few details for evaluation, we must ask why. Like private sector salesmen, politicians strive to present their wares as attractively as possible. Unlike them, however, a politician’s product line consists of claimed consequences of proposals not yet enacted. Further, politicians are unconstrained by truth in advertising laws, which would require that claims be more than misleading half-truths; they have fewer competitors keeping them honest; and they face “customers”–voters– far more ignorant about the merchandise involved than those spending their own money. These differences from the private sector explain why politicians’ “sales pitches” for their proposals are so vague. However, if vague proposals are the best politicians can offer, they are inadequate. If rhetoric is unmatched by specifics, there is no reason to believe a policy change will be an improvement, because no reliable way exists to determine whether it will actually accomplish what is promised. Only the details will determine the actual incentives facing the decision-makers involved, which is the only way to forecast the results, including the myriad of unintended consequences from unnoticed aspects. We must remember that, however laudable, goals and promises and claims of cost-effectiveness that are inconsistent with the incentives created will go unmet. It may be that President Obama knows too little of his “solution” to provide specific plans. If so, he knows too little to deliver on his promises. Achieving intended goals then necessarily depends on blind faith that Obama and a panoply of bureaucrats, legislators, overseers and commissions will somehow adequately grasp the entire situation, know precisely what to do about it, and do it right (and that the result will not be too painful, however serious the problem)–a prospect that, due to the painful lessons of history, attracts few real believers. Alternatively, President Obama may know the details of what he intends, but is not providing them to the public. But if it is necessary to conceal a plan’s details to put the best possible public face on it, those details must be adverse. If they made a more persuasive sales pitch, a politician would not hide actual details. They would be trumpeted at every opportunity, proving to a skeptical public he really had the answers, since concealing rather than revealing pays only when better informed citizens would be more inclined to reject a plan. Claiming adherence to elevated principles, but keeping detailed proposals from sight, also has a strategic advantage. It defuses critics. Absent details, any criticism can be parried by saying “that was not in our proposal” or “we have no plans to do that” or other rhetorical devices. It also allows a candidate to incorporate alternatives proposed as part of his evolving reform, as if it was his idea all along. The new administration has already put vague proposals on prominent display. However, adequate analysis cannot rest upon such flimsy foundations. That requires the nuts and bolts so glaringly absent. In the private sector, people don’t spend their own money on such vague promises of unseen products. It is foolhardy to act any differently when political salesmen withhold specifics, because political incentives guarantee that people would object to what is kept hidden. So while vagueness may be good political strategy, it virtually ensures bad policy, if Americans’ welfare is the criterion.